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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, participants in the world’s capital markets 
witnessed a shift in the tide of international listings.  As the U.S. 
financial market rapidly loses its standing as the center of the global 
economy, other countries eagerly rise to challenge its dominance.  In the 
aftermath of the Enron collapse and the “dot com” bubble burst, 
investors and other market participants are turning away from the 
regulatory burden imposed  by the rigorous U.S. securities framework.  
While some favor delisting,1 others seek jurisdictions with less stringent 
regulation in which the costs of being a public company are 
comparatively lower.2  By reducing the cost of listing and remaining 
listed, this trend allows systems that feature lighter levels of regulation 
and specialized market segments to thrive.  These events might well be 
considered symptoms of global regulatory competition among securities 
regulators and stock exchanges.3
The worldwide growth of competing trading fora and a stirring 
movement for reform in the U.S. have given new life to an old debate 
concerning the proper degree of regulatory stringency for financial 
markets.  Ascertaining the level of securities regulation that will prove 
most effective in increasing overall social welfare is not an easy task.  A 
straightforward cost-benefit examination might be insufficient to solve 
this problem, since it is difficult to quantify the economic effects of 
 1. See Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi & René M. Stulz, Has New York 
Become Less Competitive in Global Markets?: Evaluating Foreign Listing Choices 
Over Time 1 (Fisher Coll. of Bus., Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2007-03-012, 
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=982193. 
 2. See id. 
 3. See Frederick Tung, Lost in Translation: From U.S. Corporate Charter 
Competition to Issuer Choice in International Securities Regulation, 39 GA. L. REV. 525 
(2005); Merrit B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice 
is Not Investor Empowerment (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 99-008, 
1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=155928 [hereinafter Fox, Mandatory 
Disclosure]; Merrit B. Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., 
Working Paper No. 01-007, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=285294 
[hereinafter Fox, Issuer Choice]; Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in 
International Securities Regulation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Yale Int’l Ctr. for 
Fin., Working Paper No. 00-49, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=278728 
[hereinafter Romano, Competition].  This literature represents a sampling of the 
extensive scholarship produced in the field of global regulatory competition in the 
securities markets, particularly with respect to the “Issuer Choice Debate.” 
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securities regulation.4  In any case, an optimal securities framework 
should strike a balance between investor protection and compliance 
costs for listed companies.5  The tension lies in introducing proper 
measures to attain such a balance, while still allowing for the 
development of a deep and liquid capital market.  For instance, even if 
prophylactic regulation boosts investor confidence in the market, 
thereby enhancing liquidity, such rules can increase the costs of equity 
issuances beyond reasonable boundaries.6  This situation could induce 
public companies to de-list or to seek alternative listing venues.7  Yet, 
lighter levels of regulation could lead to market failures, eroding 
investor confidence to a point in which liquidity is constrained and a 
crash ensues.8
Two moments in U.S. capital market history provide further insight.  
The 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act9 (“SOX”) is often criticized for 
increasing listing costs in the U.S.10  SOX was merely the product of a 
 4. See John C. Coates, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 21 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 91 (2007) (stating that it is hard to weigh the costs and benefits of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act).  Nevertheless, the increasing convergence of securities laws and 
listing rules across jurisdictions point to some underlying compromise as to the 
minimum regulatory burden that must be imposed on public companies in order to 
protect the market. See id. 
 5. See Adam C. Pritchard, Self-regulation and Securities Markets (Georgetown 
Univ. Law Ctr., Working Paper No. 318939, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=318939. 
 6. See Romano, Competition, supra note 3.  The cost of raising capital is lowered 
if investor confidence, as a result of stringent disclosure standards, is high. See id.; see 
also John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement (Columbia 
Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 304, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=967 
482 [hereinafter Coffee, Enforcement]. 
 7. Cf. Coffee, Enforcement, supra note 6, at 19 (arguing that “although [offering] 
‘lighter’ regulation may not improve [a] cross-listing firm’s cost of capital, it could still 
attract foreign issuers by offering heightened liquidity and visibility without impeding 
their controlling shareholders’ enjoyment of private benefits”). 
 8. See Diana B. Henriques, Back from the Brink; The Fear That Made the Fed 
Step In, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1998, § 3, at 13 (discussing opposing views of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York’s arrangement of a rescue fund by Wall Street banks to 
prevent a hedge fund, Long Term Capital Management, from defaulting).  Independent 
market strategist Henry Kaufman claims that when “regulatory infrastructure is not 
strong enough or encompassing enough” there is “a better-than-even chance” of “future 
significant financial problems” in securities markets. Id. 
 9. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 
15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
 10. Doidge et al., supra note 1 (stating that despite greater costs, unique benefits 
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legislative reaction following a market crash, however, which brings to 
mind the response to the 1929 collapse that prompted the U.S. Congress 
to pass the Securities Act of 193311 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.12  Although the 1930’s measures and minor subsequent 
amendments significantly raised listing costs, they created a framework 
in which the U.S. market flourished for several decades.13  Scholars 
argue that despite its higher costs, SOX’s dissuasive effect on fraudulent 
behavior will generate net long-term benefits.14  Moreover, well-known 
regulatory figures, like former Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) chairman Arthur Levitt, call for the implementation of still 
stronger measures in the United States.15
Nevertheless, proponents of a lighter approach to securities 
regulation abound in the U.S. and abroad.16  As companies flee from the 
burden of U.S. regulation, policy-makers and scholars argue for an 
alleviation of local regulatory requirements for listed companies.  The 
Report of the Committee on Capital Market Regulation (informally 
dubbed the “Paulson Report,” after U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry 
Paulson) set the tone for reform by pointing out the erosive effect of 
regulatory intensity on U.S. dominance and competitiveness.17  The 
garnered by listing in the U.S. have not been eroded by SOX). 
 11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (2006). 
 12. Id. §§ 78a et seq. 
 13. See ROY C. SMITH & INGO WALTER, GOVERNING THE MODERN CORPORATION: 
CAPITAL MARKETS, CORPORATE CONTROL AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 222 (2006). 
The cost of this regulation was considerable, and much objected by the participants.  
One consequence, however, was that in time, public confidence in banking and 
financial markets was not only restored but enhanced, and public participation in 
those markets expanded well beyond levels that might have been imagined at the time 
the regulations were adopted. 
Id. 
 14. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, Remarks Before the Conference on the Rise and 
Effectiveness of New Corporate Governance Standards (Dec. 12, 2000), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch449.htm (stating, in regard to new SEC rules 
increasing committee disclosure requirements, “A more globally integrated and 
interconnected marketplace is upon us.  The need for vigilant oversight has become 
nothing less than a new global directive.”); see Coates, supra note 4, at 107. 
 15. Neil Weinberg, Levitt Loves Sarb-Ox, FORBES.COM, Feb. 8, 2007, 
http://www.forbes.com/business/2007/02/07/levitt-sec-sarbox-biz-
cz_nw_0207levitt.html. 
 16. See infra Part II.B. 
 17. See COMM. ON CAP. MKT. REG., INTERIM REP. (Nov. 30, 2006), available at 
http://www.capmktsreg.org/research.html (recommending amendments to regulatory 
legislation, changes to litigation procedure, and adjustments regarding the 
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publication of the Paulson Report was followed by a study conducted by 
the Commission on the Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets in the 21st 
Century.18  The argument of this more recent report hinges on a 
comprehensive overhaul of the U.S. securities framework, focusing on 
the federal government’s regulatory approach to financial markets and 
the SEC’s powers regarding SOX.19  A decline in U.S. market 
hegemony can be seen in developments like the launching of OTCQX, a 
listing service whose structure closely resembles London’s more lightly-
regulated Alternative Investment Market (“AIM”).20
This Article suggests an alternative model to the one-size-fits-all 
approach that prevails in U.S. securities regulation.  A broad approach 
might prove inadequate when tested in a global market, encompassing 
jurisdictions with differing characteristics (e.g., the technical 
sophistication of investors) or when applied to firms with heterogeneous 
incentive structures (e.g., family firms, large conglomerates).21  Market 
venues with different levels of regulatory intensity can accommodate the 
needs of various types of firms and investors, without sacrificing market 
integrity.22  A segment with stringent rules and enhanced disclosure 
requirements would be located at one end of the spectrum.  The other 
end would feature a segment with less onerous regulation, providing 
access to liquidity pools for small-cap companies that require funds for 
further expansion, or family firms that favor listing but intend to retain 
implementation of section 404 of SOX). 
 18. See CapitalMarketsCommission.com, http://www.capitalmarketscommission.co 
m/portal/capmarkets/default (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).  The Commission on the 
Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets in the 21st Century was formed by the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce as an independent group of experts.  Its mission is to preserve 
and strengthen U.S. capital markets by evaluating U.S. legal and regulatory framework 
and suggesting amendments to the current system. Id. 
 19. See COMM’N ON THE REG. OF U.S. CAP. MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, REP. AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (Mar. 2007), available at http://www.capitalmarketscommission.c 
om/portal/capmarkets/default.htm (follow link to “Download Full Report”). 
 20. See OTCQX Brochure, http://www.otcqx.com/otcqx/docs/OTCQXBrochure.p 
df (last visited Sept. 15, 2007).  The newly-formed service for over-the-counter trading 
features reduced regulatory requirements and a counselling party (the Designated 
Adviser for Disclosure), not unlike AIM’s “Nominated Adviser.” 
 21. See infra Part II.A. 
 22i See infra Part II.  Stock exchanges indeed appear to be introducing specialized 
segments for different types of firms.  Coffee notes that the increased specialization of 
stock exchanges is a direct consequence of competitive pressures building up among 
such entities. See Coffee, Enforcement, supra note 6, at 18. 
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some of the benefits of private control.23  A low-tier market segment, 
not subject to a plethora of costly rules, could be used as a stepping 
stone for companies that purport to engage in future issuances in 
primary markets like the London Stock Exchange (“LSE”), the National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (“NASDAQ”), 
or the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”).24
AIM, conceived by the LSE, embodies this novel approach to 
securities regulation.  While the LSE’s less stringent approach draws the 
attention of many large companies, AIM attracts the attention of small 
and mid-cap companies.25  In order to elude mandatory regulation, such 
as the European Union Directives, that increases transaction costs for 
listed firms, trading venues such as AIM are classified as exchange-
regulated markets.26  AIM’s model relies heavily on lower listing 
standards and lighter ongoing requirements for listed companies, paired 
with the so-called “Nominated Adviser,” a private consultant that guides 
firms through their existence as listed companies.27  This alternative 
approach propelled AIM’s rise as one of the world’s fastest growing 
exchanges, as measured by the number of initial public offerings 
(“IPOs”).28
 23. See Chris Gibson-Smith, Chairman, London Stock Exch., Address at the Risk 
Capital Summit: AIM for Europe (Oct. 4, 2005), available at http://www.londonstockex 
change.com/en-gb/about/Newsroom/Media+Resources/Speeches/aimforeurope.htm.  
This segment might also prove to be an adequate exit venue for venture capital 
investors.  The European Venture Capital Association, for instance, has shown interest 
in developing a pan-European market with lighter regulation for smaller firms. Id. 
 24. See infra Part II.B. 
 25. See First Columbus Invs., About AIM/AIM Statistics and Facts, 
http://www.first-columbus.com/aim_stats.shtml#para10 (last visited Feb. 15, 2008). 
 26. Chris Blackhurst, Cheap Trick, CNBC EUR. BUS., Jan. 1, 2006, available at 
http://cnbceb.com/2006/01/01/cheaptrick. 
 27. See LONDON STOCK EXCH., AIM THE MOST SUCCESSFUL GROWTH MARKET IN 
THE WORLD 3 (2008), available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres 
/3B5EDCF9-1E01-4B7C-A31A-95B7170675B9/0/LSEAIMBROCHURE_WEB.pdf 
(discussing AIM’s advantages, including “appropriate” regulation for smaller 
companies, and the Nominated Advisor’s role in taking “responsibility for co-ordinating 
(sic) the admission process” and carrying out “extensive due diligence to ensure the 
company is suitable for AIM”). 
 28. See Press Release, London Stock Exch., AIM Study Identifies Keys to 
Market’s Success (Nov. 13, 2007), available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/ 
NR/exeres/6B9D495B-26D4-42D6-9067-31ACC74C8F3A.htm (“[S]ince 1995 some 
2,300 British and 400 foreign companies have come to AIM, raising a total of £49 
billion, of which over 40 per cent has been in the form of further issues [and 
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AIM’s thriving success led to an outbreak of similar trading venues 
across Europe.29  The Borsa Italiana sponsored the creation of Mercato 
Expandi in December 2003;30 the Irish Enterprise Exchange was created 
in April 2005;31 Euronext quickly followed suit, launching the Alternext 
venue.32  Even the Deutsche Börse emulates AIM with its “Entry 
Standard” segment, launched in October 2005.33  When the Nordic 
OMX introduced its First North tier, commentators proclaimed the start 
of a price war that could lead European securities markets into a 
regulatory race to the bottom.34  Adding to this wariness, the disastrous 
European experience with the now extinct “New Markets” still looms in 
the mind of policymakers and investors alike.35  Despite this ominous 
forecast, European low-cost market segments continue to flourish, even 
altering the course of international cross-listings.36
This Article focuses on AIM’s regulatory model in order to explain 
the recent success of low-cost listing venues in international financial 
markets.  Part I explains how AIM covers a funding gap for companies 
whose specific characteristics preclude them from listing in senior 
markets such as NASDAQ, the NYSE, or the LSE.  In addition, it states 
that AIM’s level of regulation is close to optimal—imposing low costs 
on firms but ensuring sufficient disclosure and transparency—given the 
type of companies that seek an AIM listing and the nature of its investor 
approximately 60 per cent of the AIM’s issuances were IPO’s].”); Sridhar Arcot et al., 
The London Sch. of Econ. & Pol. Sci., From Local to Global – The Rise of AIM as a 
Stock Market for Growing Companies, available at http://www.londonstockexchange.c 
om/NR/rdonlyres/4B0DF62A-BE1E-44F5-8616-EA2891873F1D/0/AIMshortreport.pd 
f; see also First Columbus Invs., supra note 25 (providing general AIM statistics). 
 29. Blackhurst, supra note 26. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id.  “Segment” refers to a target group of listing companies, in this case small 
to mid-size companies, which must weigh the advantages of Deutsche Börse’s Entry 
Standard against the London Stock Exchange’s AIM to determine where to list their 
shares. See id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Marc Goergen et al., The Rise and Fall of the European New Markets: On 
the Short and Long-run Performance of High-tech Initial Public Offerings (Eur. Corp. 
Gov. Inst., Fin. Working Paper No. 27, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=443 
861 (providing a detailed account of the rise and fall of the European New Markets). 
 36. See Joseph Piotroski & Suraj Srinivasan, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Flow 
of International Listings (Jan. 2007) (unpublished working paper), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=956987. 
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base.  Part II traces the evolution of a regulatory dynamic that gave rise 
to the existing cost/benefit structure of stock exchanges.  Part III 
analyzes AIM’s regulatory model in an attempt to explain its recent 
success and its adequacy as a listing venue for certain types of firms.  
Part IV concludes that AIM’s model is a legitimate success, although 
remaining flaws must be corrected for the platform to continue to be 
favored by small, high-growth firms. 
II.  THE EVOLUTION OF SECURITIES REGULATION 
Financial markets have come a long way since Adam Smith 
espoused the free allocation of economic resources in market systems 
and the all-too-familiar invisible hand more than two centuries ago.37  
Without neglecting the principle of laissez-faire that allowed 
sophisticated economies to prosper, regulators and policy-makers in 
advanced jurisdictions discovered long ago that some intervention was 
necessary if financial markets were to function properly.38  Although the 
level of governmental intervention varies across jurisdictions, existing 
rules and statutes focus primarily on the importance of timely and 
accurate disclosure of relevant information to the market and corporate 
governance structures.39
It is a fundamental tenet of capital markets that an adequate flow of 
high-quality information enhances investor confidence and, thus, 
contributes to the development of deep and liquid financial markets.40  
Enhanced transparency might not only allow for timely, extensive 
information, but can also improve and homogenize the quality of the 
data disclosed.  Standardized information enables investors to compare 
different business prospects.  If investors possess a greater degree of 
 37. See SMITH & WALTER, supra note 13, at 221. 
 38. See id. at 220.  Political considerations play a large role concerning 
governmental intervention in market systems. Id. at 222.  As Smith and Walter point 
out, a democratic society is sometimes at odds with a totally free market system, in 
which some parties sustain heavy losses at the expense of others. Id. at 223.  
Consequently, legislators with political incentives often strive to transfer wealth from 
“the richer to the poorer members of a democratic society, as a measure of moral 
justice.” Id. at 224.  This is accomplished by progressive taxing and the introduction of 
measures that reduce freedom in the market. Id. at 223-24. 
 39. See id. at 272. 
 40. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, Remarks to the Inter-American Development 
Bank: The Importance of High Quality Accounting Standards (Sept. 29, 1997), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1997/spch176.txt. 
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standardized, high-quality information, they may be more inclined to 
invest in securities markets.  Disclosure is frequently coupled with 
corporate governance mechanisms that attempt to neutralize agency 
problems in listed firms.41  A balanced mix of properly enforced 
disclosure requirements and corporate governance rules is a telltale sign 
of a jurisdiction with a sophisticated capital market.42
Successive financial collapses have led policymakers to focus on 
disclosure43and corporate governance,44 by introducing and enforcing 
rules aimed at providing an adequate level of investor protection.  This 
regulatory dynamic, in which market crashes are followed by legislative 
and policy responses, still determines the aims and stringency level of 
securities laws in multiple jurisdictions.45  Market complexities, 
however, make it extremely difficult to introduce such corrective 
 41. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal 
Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH 21, 21-31 (2004). Agency problems can affect the relations that exist 
between (i) majority and minority shareholders, (ii) shareholders and management, and 
(iii) the firm and other constituencies. Id. 
 42. See generally Francisco Reyes, Corporate Governance in Latin America: A 
Functional Analysis (2007) (unpublished working paper), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1005208. 
 43. The debate regarding the importance of mandatory disclosure mainly concerns 
informational efficiency in the market, such as reducing the information gap that exists 
between public companies and investors. See Frank Partnoy, Why Markets Crash and 
What Can Law Do About It? (2000) (unpublished working paper), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=183473.  According to Partnoy, most authors agree that 
securities regulation should focus mainly on mandatory disclosure. See id. at 21; see 
also Steven M. Davidoff, Regulating Listings in a Global Market (Wayne State Univ. 
Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-02, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=964704; Coffee, Enforcement, supra note 6; Romano, 
Competition, supra note 3; Fox, Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 3. 
 44. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of 
Corporate Federalism 43 (Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst., Law Working Paper No. 23, 2004), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=606481.  In the midst of the Great Depression in 
the U.S., Associate Justice William O. Douglas identified the insufficiency of disclosure 
requirements in preventing market failures and advocated corporate governance reform.  
In Douglas’ opinion, preventing a collapse similar to the one that led to the  Depression 
in the 1930s would require regulation concerning the separation of ownership and 
control.  His proposal consisted mainly of a monitoring model in which independent 
directors would oversee management.  Bratton and McCahery explain that “Douglas’ 
article set out the basic terms of the governance agenda that has guided corporate law 
reform ever since.” Id. 
 45. See SMITH & WALTER, supra note 13, at 222. 
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measures ex ante to prevent the market from collapsing.46  Securities 
laws could thus largely be considered a regulatory response to market 
failures.  Analyzing this interaction between policymakers and the 
market is central to understanding the role of securities regulation in 
ensuring a healthy marketplace. 
A.  A Regulatory Dynamic 
The rules set out in advanced economic systems are often the result 
of a continuous regulatory dynamic in which market flaws are detected 
and fixed ex post.47  Most major interventions in the world’s financial 
systems are the result of a market collapse, often preceded by the burst 
of speculative bubbles and corporate scandals.48  Early examples of this 
trend include the failure of the Mississippi and South Sea Companies in 
the eighteenth century, which led to significant investor losses, general 
public outrage, and ensuing governmental intervention.  The stories 
behind both scandals are well known.  After the French and English 
governments, respectively, granted monopolistic positions to each 
company, public investors poured funds into these ventures.  In each 
case information was manipulated or concealed from the market and a 
harmful speculative bubble was quick to inflate and burst, leading to 
massive losses for the unwary investors of both companies.49  The 
 46. See Partnoy, supra note 43, at 3. 
 47. See Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation: 300 Hundred 
Years of Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849 (1997), available at http://law.wustl.edu/WU 
LR/75-2/752-5.html; John C. Coffee, Jr., A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the 
U.S. and Europe Differ (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 274, 2005), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=694581 [hereinafter Coffee, Scandals]. 
 48. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of 
Fashioning Relevant Reforms 5 (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 237, 
2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=447940 [hereinafter Coffee, Gatekeeper].  
This crash-then-law sequence has repeated itself multiple times over the course of 
several centuries “with financial regulation following largely as a response to market 
crashes.” See Partnoy, supra note 43, at 3. 
 49. See Joseph McCahery & Erik Vermeulen, Corporate Governance and 
Innovation: Venture Capital, Joint Venture and Family Businesses (Eur. Corp. Gov. 
Inst., Law Working Paper No. 65, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=894785.  
In the case of the South Sea Company, for instance, crucial information regarding the 
Spanish dominion of key New World territories was concealed from the public. See id. 
at 11.  “The South Sea Company was in fact nothing more than an empty shell without 
any future cash flows and expectations.” Id.  The South Sea Company endured an 80% 
loss in the value of its shares in the period leading to its collapse. Partnoy, supra note 
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upshot of these debacles was not only swift governmental action, but 
also a general loss of confidence in the corporate form, which persisted 
until the Industrial Revolution.50
In the United States, the regulatory dynamic in securities regulation 
has been far more visible than in other jurisdictions.  Following the 
devastation of the First World War in Europe, the U.S. emerged as the 
leading center for financial services.  Unrestrained market activity 
characterized the 1920s era, in which high returns were often the result 
of speculation and market manipulation.51  In 1929, the speculative 
bubble finally ruptured, throwing the U.S. economy into a period of 
economic decline, aptly termed the Great Depression.  Public discontent 
eventually led to the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the 
implementation of his New Deal policies, which sought to reactivate the 
economy and restore public confidence in the market.52  The Securities 
Act of 193353 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193454 served as 
cornerstones of his policy agenda and were swiftly approved by 
Congress.55  These measures significantly raised the costs of being a 
listed company in the U.S.56  Despite raising compliance costs, 
governmental intervention (including the passage of both acts) 
succeeded in restoring public confidence and allowed financial markets 
to flourish.  Although corporate scandals and minor market crashes 
occurred during the ensuing decades, the United States enjoyed a period 
43, at 8. 
 50. See David Sanders, Financial Catastrophes: The Overthrow of Modern 
Financial Theory (Oct. 2003) (unpublished working paper), 
http://www.actuaries.org.uk/files/pdf/proceedings/giro2003/Sanders.pdf.  Historical 
records concerning the South Sea bubble crash point to Robert Walpole as leading an 
investigation, which ultimately resulted in the introduction of several measures to 
increase public confidence. See id. app. 1. 
 51. See SMITH & WALTER, supra note 13, at 58. 
 52. See id.  During this period “lost market values, bankruptcies and scandals led to 
cries for punishment of the ‘guilty’ and improved regulation to prevent future 
recurrences.  The 1929 crash was a watershed event because it was seen at the time as 
the cause of the ruinous economy that followed a decade of prosperity.” Id. at 7. 
 53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (2006). 
 54. Id. 78a et seq. 
 55. See SMITH & WALTER, supra note 13, at 7-8. 
 56. See ALAN R. PALMITER, SECURITIES REGULATION: EXAMPLES AND 
EXPLANATIONS (3d ed. 2005) (giving a detailed explanation of such measures). 
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of relative stability that was to last until the end of the twentieth 
century.57
After the vibrant takeover wave of the 1980s, the U.S. economy 
entered a high-growth period in which market conditions were optimal 
for the economic expansion of the following decade.  As high-tech start-
up firms started to dominate the marketplace, investors and gatekeepers 
alike were caught in a wave of irrational exuberance that would 
ultimately lead to a market collapse of vast dimensions.58  The bull 
market of the 1990s saw stock indices rise to unprecedented levels, 
peaking in 2000: the NASDAQ Composite Index reached 5,048, the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average rose to 11,722, and the S&P 500 peaked 
at 1,527.  Despite the buoyant expansion of this decade, the problems 
that foreshadowed the passage of SOX soon became evident.  As the 
1990s economy slowed, the high overvaluation of tech-related stocks, 
largely fuelled by market euphoria, negatively affected investors in 
equity markets.59  Widespread gatekeeper failure accompanying 
notorious fraud scandals at some of the largest U.S. companies60 and 
public anxiety following terrorist attacks on New York played a large 
part in shifting public opinion against regulatory laxity.61  Federal 
intervention was swift.62  After Enron’s stock plummeted amid 
 57. See SMITH & WALTER, supra note 13, at 8 (recording the existence of a bubble 
burst in 1958, which was followed by minor intervention embodied by the passage of 
the Williams Act, and another crash in 1987, which only gave rise to reforms by stock 
exchanges). 
 58. See id. at 10-12. 
 59. Edwin J. Perkins, Book Review, 6 OXFORD J. ENTER. & SOC’Y 557, 557-58 
(2005) (reviewing ROGER LOWENSTEIN, ORIGINS OF THE CRASH: THE GREAT BUBBLE 
AND ITS UNDOING (Penguin 2004)). 
 60. See Coffee, Gatekeeper, supra note 48, at 5. 
 61. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 44, at 46-47 (arguing that the 
combination of three elements led to the passage of SOX—“a major and ongoing 
decline in the equity markets . . . headline-grabbing stories of corporate corruption and 
popular anger towards corporate management”—and pointing out that these same 
ingredients were also instrumental in the enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act during the 1970s); see also supra notes 11-13 (explaining responses to the 1929 
market crash and how the economy flourished thereafter). 
 62. See SMITH & WALTER, supra note 13, at 7-8 (asserting that a general loss of 
confidence in the U.S. financial market, a loss of market capitalization estimated at over 
$8 trillion, and increasing public outrage are some of the factors that may have 
prompted the federal government to intervene so rapidly). 
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accounting scandals and paper-shredding rumors, and Worldcom 
collapsed, the U.S. Congress raced to pass SOX.63
Federal intervention again broke from the historical trend that each 
state regulates the corporate affairs of its companies.64  The newly 
enacted SOX imposed stiff corporate governance requirements on 
publicly-held corporations, particularly with regard to the company’s 
auditing processes.65  Scholars across the U.S. still argue whether the 
costs imposed by raising governance hurdles are justified.66  
Specifically, the SOX debate turns on whether the Act reduced the cost 
of capital in the U.S. more than it increased the regulatory burden for 
publicly-held companies.67
 63. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 44, at 47.  In their account of the SOX 
enactment process, Bratton and McCahery explain that as the Senate held hearings on 
the bill that would become SOX,  Worldcom collapsed, leading to an accelerated 
approval of the new law. Id. 
 64. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper 04-37, 2005), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=596101 [hereinafter Romano, Sarbanes-Oxley]; Bratton & 
McCahery, supra note 44, at 35.  The securities acts of the 1930s had also impinged on 
states’ autonomy in corporate affairs.  Even though such laws did not directly concern 
company law matters, they clearly affected the way firms operated.  The Securities Act 
of 1933, although passed almost four years after the stock market crash of 1929, was the 
result of hasty governmental intervention. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Political Economy 
of the Securities Act of 1933 2 (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Working Paper 
No. 00-11, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=224729. 
 65. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2006).  
As stated in the preamble to SOX, its purpose is “to protect investors by improving the 
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws.” 
Id.  The Act is applicable to public firms incorporated in the U.S., public accounting 
firms, any person or company involved in audit or reporting under U.S. law, and to 
foreign firms that undergo public issuances in the U.S. See id.  Some of the provisions 
set out in SOX concern (i) the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board, (ii) a requirement to set into place strong control structures and evaluate them 
periodically, (iii) certifications by CEOs and CFOs of  financial reports, (iv) completely 
independent audit committees, and (v) a prohibition of personal loans to management. 
See id. 
 66. See supra notes 43-44.  A vast array of academic literature addresses the costs 
and benefits structure of SOX and its impact on the U.S. market. 
 67. See Posting of Larry Ribstein to Ideoblog, Should We Care About the Decline 
in U.S. IPOs?, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/11/should_we_care_.html 
(Nov. 25, 2006, 7:18 AM) (arguing that this valuation cannot be effectively undertaken 
without the benefit of hindsight). 
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While both sides offer compelling arguments for68 and against69 the 
Act, recent reports, which single out the 2002 law as one of the main 
reasons for the loss of competitiveness of the U.S. financial markets, 
tend to bolster the argument of SOX’s opponents.70  The Report of the 
Committee on Capital Market Regulation, released on November 30, 
2006, concluded that regulatory intensity set into place by SOX and 
similar legislative efforts eroded U.S. dominance and competitiveness.71  
After carefully analyzing the current state of affairs in the U.S., the blue-
ribbon Paulson Committee recommended amendments to securities 
regulation and litigation, as well as adjustments regarding the 
implementation of SOX section 404.72  The publication of the Paulson 
Report preceded a study conducted by the Commission on the 
Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets in the 21st Century.  This report 
suggests a comprehensive overhaul of U.S. securities regulation, 
centered on the federal government’s approach to financial markets, the 
SEC’s powers regarding SOX, and the U.S. litigation framework.73  A 
third report sprung from a joint effort between New York City’s Mayor 
Michael Bloomberg and Senator Charles E. Schumer.74  After 
 68. See, e.g., Robert J. Brown, Criticizing the Critics: Sarbanes-Oxley and Quack 
Corporate Governance, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 309 (2006) (providing several counter-
arguments for the main critiques of SOX); Coates, supra note 4, at 92. 
 69. See, e.g., HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, ABSTRACT TO THE 
SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: HOW TO FIX IT AND WHAT WE’VE LEARNED 4 (2006) 
(arguing that “[b]y imposing the costs of eliminating fraud on all firms in investors’ 
portfolios, the SOX mandates are a terrible deal for the ordinary investors it purports to 
protect”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Sarbanes-Oxley: Legislating in Haste, Repenting in 
Leisure 15 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law-Econ. Research Paper No. 06-14, 2006) (arguing 
that “by raising the cost of access to the capital markets, SOX likely will slow down the 
economy in the long-run”); Edward F. Greene, Beyond Borders: Time to Tear Down the 
Barriers to Global Investing, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 85, 86 (2007) (arguing that “[t]he 
current U.S. regulatory scheme makes cross-border investment costly and inefficient”); 
Romano, Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 64, at 2-3. 
 70. Whether SOX erodes U.S. competitiveness is beyond the scope of this paper.  
However, it is important to note that the U.S. securities framework, including the SOX 
provisions, impose high costs on publicly-held firms.  Smaller firms bear a 
disproportionate part of such costs and will thus refrain from going public, seek 
alternative listing venues, or de-list. See infra Part II.C. 
 71. See COMM. ON CAP. MKT. REG., supra note 17. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See COMM’N ON THE REG. OF U.S. CAP. MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra 
note 19. 
 74. See MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW 
2008 THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT MARKET 271 
 
identifying several factors that have eroded New York’s leading 
position, including the migration of IPO activity and strong dynamics 
driving the growth of non-U.S. markets, the Bloomberg-Schumer report 
calls for urgent action “at the national, State and City levels to enhance 
the competitiveness of the U.S. financial markets and defend New 
York’s role as a global financial center.”75  Lending further credence to 
the three reports, a recent study displaced New York as the world’s top 
financial services center, awarding London the highest ranking.76
As the U.S. markets slowly adapted to SOX’s regulatory 
framework, the European Union became immersed in a series of 
corporate scandals of their own.  Irregularities in high-profile European 
firms such as Parmalat and Hollinger, however, stemmed from a 
different source than the North American episodes.  Whereas Enron, 
Worldcom and similar cases concerned manipulation of financial 
statements by management, Parmalat eventually collapsed after 
controlling shareholders misappropriated company assets in an amount 
close to $17 billion.77
Disparities in the corporate governance systems of the United States 
and Europe account for the methodological differences in both types of 
fraudulent behavior.  The dispersed shareholder model that prevails in 
the U.S. and its equity-based system of executive compensation created 
a set of incentives for managers to engage in financial manipulation in 
order to maximize personal benefits.78  The European concentrated 
YORK’S AND THE U.S.’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP (2007), available at 
http://www.schumer.senate.gov/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/special_reports/2007/NY_
REPORT%20_FINAL.pdf.  This report is also tough on SOX.  Its preamble 
categorically criticizes SOX for having eroded U.S. competitiveness: “The flawed 
implementation of [SOX] which produced far heavier costs than expected, has only 
aggravated the situation.” Id. 
 75. See id. at 29.  An expert group commissioned to modernize securities 
legislation in Canada recently found that SOX had a detrimental impact on U.S. capital 
markets, to the extent that it was allegedly introduced without consideration of essential 
market characteristics (e.g., the influence of gatekeepers, the effectiveness of private 
enforcement, and the role of market forces).  The report hinges on whether to introduce 
reforms to the Canadian system that would bring it closer to the LSE’s and AIM’s level 
of regulation than the one set forth by SOX. See JOHN BOARD ET AL., THE LSE’S AIM 
MARKET: EFFECT ON RETURNS AND TRADING OF CANADIAN STOCKS (2006). 
 76. See Alan Beattie, London Named Top Financial Centre, FIN. TIMES, June 11, 
2007 (showing London at the top position of the world’s top fifty financial centers, with 
New York, Tokyo, and Chicago as runners-up). 
 77. See Coffee, Scandals, supra note 47, at 14. 
 78. See id. at 18.  Upon receiving stock options as remuneration for their services, 
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ownership model generated conditions under which controlling parties 
were able to expropriate other constituencies.79  Accordingly, the 
Parmalat racket largely consisted of controlling shareholders siphoning 
company assets through related party transactions.80  However, financial 
statement misrepresentations and other instances of fraud involving 
European public firms had been uncovered even before the Milan Stock 
Exchange suspended trading in Parmalat shares at the end of 2003.81  
The European Commission responded by introducing a series of 
amendments, “including an Action Plan for the modernization of 
company law and plans for the reform of the statutory audit.”82
Ultimately, securities regulation will have net positive effects if it 
reduces the cost of capital more than it raises regulatory costs for listed 
companies in a given jurisdiction.83  Regulatory costs, while varying in 
nature, are often imposed without regard to a firm’s size or specific 
managers had an incentive to tamper with a firm’s short-term profits, since better results 
meant a higher payout derived from such options. Id. at 7. 
 79. See id. at 11-13 (explaining that the European model allows controlling parties 
to expropriate the minority holders’ interests). 
 80. See id. at 14.  After bond issuances for $150 million and $200 million in 2003, 
Parmalat’s financial statements were subject to rigorous scrutiny. See Guido Alessandro 
Ferrarini & Paolo Giudici, Financial Scandals and the Role of Private Enforcement: 
The Parmalat Case 9 (Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst., Law Working Paper No. 40, 2005), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=730403.  Auditors 
detected some irregularities concerning funds supposedly deposited in an offshore 
account held by Bonlat, a Cayman Island subsidiary of Parmalat. See Ferrarini & 
Giudici, supra.  A governmental inquiry subsequently unveiled the truth—no such 
account existed.  Members of the company’s management had apparently forged a letter 
from the Bank of America and manipulated financial statements for over a decade. See 
Coffee, Scandals, supra note 47, at 14. 
 81. See Abe De Jong et al., Royal Ahold: A Failure of Corporate Governance 13 
(Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst., Fin. Working Paper No. 67/2005, 2005), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=663504.  Managers in the Dutch 
Ahold company had overstated financial statements by consolidating amounts derived 
from a 50-50 joint venture (which is not permitted under Dutch regulation unless the 
consolidating company has effective control of the venture) and then tried to cover such 
irregularities by misrepresenting control of the joint venture in a series of letters. Id.  
Deceptive accounting in an Ahold U.S. subsidiary—U.S. Foodservices—was also 
uncovered. See id. at 12-13. 
 82. See John Armour & Joseph A. McCahery, After Enron: Improving Corporate 
Law and Modernising Securities Regulation in Europe and the U.S. 3 (Amsterdam Ctr. 
for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 2006-07, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=910205. 
 83. See Coffee, Enforcement, supra note 6, at 70-71. 
2008 THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT MARKET 273 
 
incentive structure.84  Accordingly, it is up to each firm to balance the 
costs of listing against its benefits when deciding whether to go public.85  
If the introduction of strict auditing and disclosure rules raise listing 
costs too high, a firm may seek other listing venues, alternative 
financing mechanisms, or even undergo delisting procedures.86
However important this homogeneous cost structure is in ensuring 
investor protection, it might also become a deterrent for small-cap 
companies that cannot afford to endure such costs, or family firms that 
could derive higher benefits from remaining unlisted.87  It follows that 
one-size-fits-all rules can have negative spillover effects vis-à-vis 
 84. See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 69 (arguing that SOX has a negative 
overall impact on investors, since it includes the costs of eliminating fraud on all listed 
firms—with some exceptions for foreign firms).  In the authors’ opinion, investors will 
profit from securities regulation only: 
if the benefit from reduced fraud is greater than the cost of compliance by the firms 
they invest in. . . . Moreover, it is well-accepted in the financial economics literature 
that the costs and benefits of securities regulation should be evaluated from the 
perspective of shareholders who can avoid some costs of fraud by investing in 
diversified portfolios of shares. 
Id. at 2. 
 85. See Amin N. Licht, Cross-Listing and Corporate Governance: Bonding or 
Avoiding?, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 141 passim (2003) [hereinafter Licht, Bonding].  Licht also 
suggests that the listing decision may be a consequence of opportunistic behavior on 
behalf of corporate insiders.  In this scenario, such insiders would derive a higher direct 
benefit than the firm. See id. 
 86. See, e.g., Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, The Internal 
Organization of Private Equity and Hedge Fund-oriented Governance, Maandblad voor 
accountancy en Bedrijfseconomie (forthcoming 2007) (arguing that “these funds not 
only endeavour to deliver superior returns by diligent research and insightful analysis, 
but also by actively reshaping a portfolio firm’s business policy and strategy”); William 
W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets (Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst., Law 
Working Paper No. 80, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=928689 (explaining 
some of the different strategies used by private equity and hedge funds in order to 
maximize investment returns).  The recent “going private” movement led by private 
equity and hedge funds worldwide may be seen as a sign that the costs of being a listed 
company in certain jurisdictions exceed its benefits.  Private equity funds can obtain 
high returns on their investment by lowering regulatory costs associated with disclosure 
and compliance, implementing customized business policies, and then taking the 
company public again. See McCahery & Vermeulen, supra. 
 87. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 44, at 50.  SOX requirements in the U.S. 
have been criticized for raising compliance costs more than compliance benefits for 
certain types of firms.  “In particular, the costs bear more heavily on a marginal class of 
firms that will be discouraged from going public or, if already public, might be forced 
to go private.” Id. 
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smaller public firms, which are forced to bear a disproportionate part of 
the regulatory costs of listing.88  These firms are thus compelled to 
operate under low or even negative profit margins, which could 
eventually cause them to go private.89  Accordingly, it might be possible 
to specifically tailor cost structures to accommodate the needs of 
different types of firms, while still ensuring an adequate level of 
disclosure and investor protection.90  Specialized rules can be a natural 
outcome of increasing regulatory competition among stock exchanges.91  
Even though some expect this competition to lead to convergence 
around uniform rules, the most likely outcome is increased 
specialization of listing venues.92
 88. See Davidoff, supra note 43, at 2, 7, 43; see also ROBERT ABBANAT, EASDAQ, 
S.A., FEASIBILITY STUDY: A PAN-EUROPEAN MARKET FOR TECHNOLOGY GROWTH 
COMPANIES 6-7 (2004), available at http://www.europabio.org/documents/MIT-
Full.pdf; Coffee, Enforcement, supra note 6, at 13-14, 42-43; Bainbridge, supra note 
69, at 13. 
SOX imposes high regulatory costs that place particular burdens on smaller publicly-
held companies.  As a result, many firms are deciding not to go public, while a 
substantial number of public firms are going private.  SOX thus reduces investor 
choice, makes many investments less liquid, and in the long run likely will discourage 
entrepreneurship by denying start-ups access to financing in the capital markets. 
Id.  One could add to Bainbridge’s remark the fact that some of these smaller firms are 
seeking alternative listing venues such as AIM. See infra Part III; see also William J. 
Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of Going Private 
(Emory Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 05-4, Feb. 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=672761 (providing interesting empirical data to support the 
hypothesis that smaller firms are disproportionately affected by one-size-fits-all rules 
like the ones contained in SOX). 
 89. See Bainbridge, supra note 69, at 12-13. 
 90. See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 69, at 4 (arguing that although investors do 
not like to be defrauded and do want some regulation, they “will find such regulation 
valuable only if the benefit from reduced fraud is greater than the cost of regulatory 
compliance”). 
 91. See Coffee, Enforcement, supra note 6, at 14-15.  Competition among 
exchanges has been escalating in recent times, leading to highly publicized events such 
as the NYSE’s acquisition of Euronext, NASDAQ’s failed attempts to acquire the LSE 
and, of course, the latter’s attempt to acquire the Borsa Italiana. See id. at 14 n.31; see 
also Davidoff, supra note 43, at 14-15. 
 92. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top: The Impact of Cross-Listings 
and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance (Columbia Law 
Sch. Working Paper No. 205, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=315840 
[hereinafter Coffee, Cross-Listings]; Coffee, Enforcement, supra note 6, at 18-19.  
According to Jackson and Gkantinis, the demutualization and subsequent listing of 
stock exchanges has changed their inherent incentive structure, such that these entities 
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An assortment of securities by-products could result, such as 
stringent requirements that enhance bonding benefits, or cheap access to 
equity for small firms.93  The introduction of lower market tiers with 
varying degrees of regulatory stringency could enhance public welfare, 
while still retaining main market regulatory levels.94  Each tier would 
possess unique advantages and impose a certain level of expenditure in 
accordance with the cost/benefit structure explained below. 
B.  The Cost/Benefit Structure of Financial Markets 
Financial market access provides public firms with a series of 
benefits unavailable to private companies.  It also imposes significant 
costs upon a firm’s operations.  The extent to which a company derives a 
net benefit from gaining admittance to a stock exchange depends largely 
on the relevant regulatory model, as well as on the firm’s particular 
traits.  For instance, the strict U.S. securities framework creates a niche 
in which companies benefit from reductions in the cost of capital and a 
higher valuation premium.95  These conditions are optimal for large 
firms that pursue public equity financing or that cross-list for bonding 
purposes.96  Conversely, jurisdictions that feature lighter regulation can 
offer smaller firms heightened visibility and liquidity at lower cost.97  
This divergence in regulatory models leads authors to categorize the 
levels of regulatory stringency available for companies seeking equity 
now cater to the interests of shareholders instead of their members. See Howell E. 
Jackson & Stavros Gkantinis, Markets as Regulators: A Survey 11-15 (Harvard Law & 
Econ. Discussion Paper No. 579, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=960168.  This has increased competitive pressures 
among exchanges, which now seek to increase profit margins by developing and 
offering new products. See id. 
 93. Cf. Coffee, Enforcement, supra note 6, at 18-19. 
 94. See id. at 59-60.  Coffee posits that it may be perverse to listen to the siren call 
of those who intend to reduce the levels of regulatory stringency for listed companies in 
the U.S.  In his opinion, this would increase the cost of capital in the U.S. and reduce 
the benefits arising from the bonding premium available to firms that cross-list into U.S. 
capital markets. Id. 
 95. See, e.g., Coffee, Enforcement, supra note 6 (suggesting that higher disclosure 
standards have a considerable impact in lowering the cost of capital for listed firms); 
Goergen et al., supra note 35, at 1 (same); Romano, supra note 3 (same). 
 96. See Piotroski & Srinivasan, supra note 36, at 6. 
 97. See Coffee, Enforcement, supra note 6, at 19.  However, firms listing in these 
markets would not benefit from the lower cost of capital that characterizes jurisdictions 
with a higher level of enforcement. See id. 
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financing.  Although several of these market taxonomies exist, this 
Article refers to a sequential classification in which jurisdictions abide 
by low, middle or high regulatory models.98
In each model, the pros and cons of listing vary gradually.  One 
must understand the cost/benefit structure of capital markets to measure 
the impact of the disparities upon various categories of firms.99  Firms 
incur both direct and indirect costs upon going public and maintaining 
their listing.  The direct costs of going public may include initial listing 
fees, IPO underwriting fees, professional fees like legal and accounting 
advisers, and other compliance expenses.100  Indirect costs of going 
public include the loss of private control suffered by controlling 
shareholders, like the loss of proprietary information due to disclosure 
requirements, and IPO underpricing, which can occur in some listing 
venues.101  Direct costs of remaining listed include recurring expenses, 
like stock exchange fees, legal and accounting advisory fees, or charges 
for new issuances of stock.  Indirect costs of remaining listed can 
include diverted managers’ attention from maximizing shareholder 
value, distorted directors’ and managers’ incentive structures, and 
management exposure to excessive litigation.102  Figure 1 shows the cost 
structure of capital markets. 
 98. See Davidoff, supra note 43, at 44-50.  Although this paper classifies these 
approaches sequentially, it is important to note the approach suggested by Jackson and 
Gkantinis, whereby regulatory responsibility is divided into a Government-led model 
(e.g., France and Germany), a Flexibility model (e.g., U.K. and Hong Kong) and a 
Cooperation model (e.g., U.S. and Canada). See Jackson & Gkantinis, supra note 92, at 
3. 
 99. See Coates, supra note 4, at 92; Amin N. Licht, Regulatory Arbitrage for Real: 
International Securities Regulation in a World of Interacting Securities Markets, 38 
VA. J. INT’L L. 563 (2001) [hereinafter Licht, Regulation] (arguing that pricing legal 
rules is a complex task).  Although some of these costs and benefits may be weighed 
and measured accurately, certain factors, such as gauging indirect costs, make it 
difficult to calculate the overall effect of securities regulation. Coates, supra note 4, at 
106. 
 100. See CHRISTOPH KASERER & DIRK SCHIERECK, DEUTSCHE BÖRSE AG, THE COST 
OF CAPITAL: GOING PUBLIC AND BEING PUBLIC, AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE 
STUDY (2006) (on file with the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law).  Such 
compliance costs may refer to specific corporate governance or other requirements 
imposed in different regulatory frameworks. Id. 
 101. Cf. Goergen et al., supra note 35, at 3 (detailing an analysis of IPO 
underpricing in junior equity markets). 
 102. See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 69, at 2 (arguing that these indirect costs 
have a significant impact on financial markets and that SOX raised indirect costs to a 
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FIGURE 1 
THE COST STRUCTURE OF CAPITAL MARKET 
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Source: KASERER & SCHIERECK, supra note 100, at 13. 
 
Firms also derive many benefits from gaining admittance to capital 
markets.  For instance, in order to address increasing levels of 
competition, listing allows companies to raise equity for expansion or 
maintenance plans.103  Firms might also reduce or eliminate higher-
interest debt obligations by raising less costly funds in equity markets.104  
Market listing can also provide an exit mechanism for incumbent 
shareholders,105 or enhance a company’s visibility and reputation.106  
point where the U.S. market has been severely affected). 
 103. See Felice B. Friedman & Claire Grose, Promoting Access to Primary Equity 
Markets: A Legal and Regulatory Approach, 7-8, 13 (World Bank Pol’y Res., Working 
Paper No. 3892, 2006). 
 104. See Alexander Ljungqvist, IPO Underpricing, in HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE VOLUME 1 375, 378 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 
2007). 
 105. See Bernard Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of 
Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243 (1998); Cf. 
Douglas J. Cumming & Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, A Cross Country Comparison of Full 
and Partial Venture Capital Exists, 27 J. BANKING & FIN. 511, 512 (2003) (discussing 
that an IPO allows venture capitalists to obtain a significant return on their initial 
investment and entrepreneurs to regain control of the newly-listed company). 
 106. See Friedman & Grose, supra note 103 (explaining that academic literature 
regarding the listing decision is profuse); Ivo Welch & Jay Ritter, A Review of IPO 
Activity, Pricing and Allocations 5-6 (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 02-01, 
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Small and medium-sized companies are particularly drawn to equity 
financing, due to credit constraints and the high cost of capital that debt 
financing can pose.107  Credit constraints are largely the result of 
financial entities’ bias toward projects with low risk.108  The provisions 
contained in the Basel II Accord might have further tightened credit for 
small companies,109 luring them away from debt financing and into 
capital markets.110
More stringent regulation, however, is a two-way street.  Academic 
literature refers extensively to the “bonding hypothesis,” whereby cross-
listing firms profit from adopting the higher governance standards of a 
foreign jurisdiction.111  A listed company’s management can seek to 
2002) (classifying the reasons for going public under the Life-Cycle Model, in which 
companies that reach a specific size have more to gain from going public, and the 
Market-Timing Model, in which companies will not go public if they consider that the 
market will undervalue them). 
 107. See Don Cruickshank, Market Failure in the Provision of Equity to SMEs, in 
COMPETITION IN UK BANKING: A REPORT TO THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER 169 
(2000) (analyzing the different causes of such credit constraints). 
 108. See OXFORD ANALYTICA, ASSESSMENT OF THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS AND 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR A PAN-EUROPEAN GROWTH MARKET 5 (Oct. 2005) (a study 
prepared for the LSE). 
 109. See MONDO VISIONE LTD., WORLD EXCHANGES: GLOBAL INDUSTRY OUTLOOK 
AND INVESTMENT ANALYSIS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 (Mar. 2007), available at 
http://www.mondovisione.com/index.cfm?section=order&action=detail&id=2 (“The 
implementation of more stringent lending rules for E.U. banks under the Basel II 
Capital Adequacy Directive may provide further encouragement for small European 
companies to raise funds by going public.”). 
 110. See id.  Credit constraints have a larger effect on European firms than on their 
American counterparts, given the former’s higher reliance on debt for financing 
purposes. See G. Andrew Karolyi, The World of Cross-Listings and Cross-Listings of 
the World: Challenging Conventional Wisdom 21 (Dice Ctr., Working Paper No. 2004-
14, 2004), available at http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/fin/dice/papers/2004/2004/2004-
14.pdf. 
 111. See, e.g., Coffee, Cross-Listings, supra note 92, at 78; Coffee, Enforcement, 
supra note 6, at 5; Jonathan Witmer, Why Do Firms Cross-Delist? An Examination of 
the Determinants and Effects of Cross-Delisting 5 (Sept. 2006) (unpublished working 
paper), available at http://www.fma.org/SLC/Papers/Cross_delistings.pdf; Karolyi, 
supra note 110, at 14. But cf. Licht, Bonding, supra note 85, at 148-49 (rebutting 
bonding as an instrument for merely improving corporate governance standards, and 
contending that the aim of cross-listing for bonding purposes is twofold and ultimately 
unrelated to bona fide self-discipline on behalf of managers).  Licht refers to corporate 
governance as a second-order consideration that can even have a negative role in the 
context of bonding and cross-listing, to the extent that it deters some issuers from listing 
in markets with more stringent regulation or gives rise to exemptions granted by the 
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increase firm value by cross-listing in a foreign market, voluntarily 
subjecting the company to more stringent regulation in the second 
jurisdiction.112  In so doing, the firm adopts—at least in part—the 
foreign governance regime and is “bonded” by its more severe 
provisions.113  Bonding benefits are usually exploited by larger public 
companies that have sufficient resources to afford an increase in 
regulatory compliance costs.114
If regulation is relaxed, the utility of bonding can be significantly 
stunted, especially in the U.S. market—the venue most often targeted for 
bonding.115  Regulatory costs in the U.S. and European traditional 
exchanges, however, could be too high for small and mid-size 
companies that pursue equity financing.116  Specialized market 
segments, not subject to a plethora of costly securities regulation, could 
provide these companies with public equity until they reach a stage in 
their growth cycles that allows them to list in senior markets. 
C.  The Public Equity Funding Gap 
Clearly, firms must take into account the particular cost/benefit 
structure of the venue in which they intend to issue and trade their shares 
before listing or cross-listing in capital markets.  Such analysis, if 
conducted properly, allows firms to maximize the utility obtained from 
accessing a specific equity market.  For instance, a large, private U.S. 
local regulator to foreign firms that cross-list (i.e., the “avoiding hypothesis”). See id. at 
142. 
 112. See Witmer, supra note 111, at 5 (arguing that “in this case, management 
receives a net utility gain as the increase in their utility from firm value outweighs the 
utility reduction from the loss of some private benefits of control”). 
 113. See, e.g., id.  By listing in the U.S., firms have traditionally maximized bonding 
benefits since, upon listing, the firm is monitored closely by multiple constituencies, 
including institutional investors that acquire shares in the company, lurking private 
equity and hedge funds, auditors, and even the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
See id. 
 114. See Bainbridge, supra note 69, at 2. 
 115. See, e.g., AIM in a U.S. Context: Exploding Some Myths, WHITE PAPER (First 
Columbus Invs. & London Stock Exch.), 2006, at 2, http://www.first-
columbus.com/fc_publications.php (accept “Disclaimer”; then download “AIM in a 
U.S. Context: Exploding Some Myths”).  In spite of the alleged negative effects of 
SOX, the U.S. share of global IPOs increased from 8% in 2001 to 15% in 2005, 
showing that SOX may have more to it than meets the eye. See id. 
 116. See id. (comparing the regulatory environments of London and New York for 
small companies); Bainbridge, supra note 69, at 2. 
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firm might find it optimal to list in the NYSE or NASDAQ, despite the 
high costs imposed by U.S. regulation, due to the multiple benefits the 
firm would derive from such a listing.117  Similarly, a listed European 
firm may opt to undergo a cross-listing in either of these exchanges, 
whether to profit from the bonding benefits associated with a U.S. listing 
or to create or expand its U.S. operations.118  A flawed analysis of the 
cost/benefit structure of listing venues could lead to adverse results.119  
Absent special circumstances, a NASDAQ-listed company that seeks to 
improve its valuation premium by undergoing multiple listings in South 
American stock exchanges might find its task highly unrewarding.120
It follows from the previous discussion that an optimal listing venue 
for each type of firm exists, depending on specific traits like market 
capitalization and growth stage, and market conditions at the time of 
listing.121  Assuming this hypothesis is accurate, recent events in Europe 
and the United States might have altered the optimal choice of venue for 
small-cap firms, excluding them from traditional stock exchanges.  First, 
regulatory costs for listed companies have dramatically increased due to 
the burden of SOX compliance122 and the stringent corporate 
governance and listing standards mandated by the main stock 
exchanges.123  These costs disproportionately affect small firms, 
 117. See, e.g., Coffee, Enforcement, supra note 6, at 71.  A large private firm may, 
for example, lower its cost of capital, obtain higher visibility, or secure sufficient funds 
for expansion plans. See id. 
 118. Royal Philips Electronics N.V. exemplifies the typical European corporation 
with a dual listing.  Its shares are traded both in the NYSE (ticker: PHG) and Euronext 
Amsterdam (ticker: PHI). 
 119. See Witmer, supra note 111, at 30-34. 
 120. See generally id. at 26 (discussing NASDAQ cross-listing generally). 
 121. Cf. Wolfgang Aussenegg et al., Sticky Prices: IPO Pricing on NASDAQ and 
the Neuer Markt 39 (Apr. 2002) (unpublished working paper), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=302917.  Market capitalization in 
the IPO stage refers to the value obtained after multiplying the offer price times the 
number of shares outstanding after completion of the offering. See id. 
 122. See Coates, supra note 4, at 107 (presenting evidence which suggests that SOX 
increases auditing costs by a ratio of $1 million per $1 billion of revenue). But see 
THOMAS E. HARTMAN, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, THE COST OF BEING PUBLIC IN THE ERA 
OF SARBANES-OXLEY (2006), available at http://www.foley.com/publications/pub_detai 
l.aspx?pubid=3736 (presenting the results of a survey showing that SOX costs appear to 
be decreasing as firms streamline compliance with the Act’s provisions). 
 123. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 48745, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 64154-01 (Nov. 4, 2003) (approving the NYSE’s and NASDAQ’s enhanced 
corporate governance standards for listed companies, which significantly raised the 
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precluding them from listing in mainstream regulated markets, or even 
causing them to de-list.124  Although European listing costs are lower 
than in the U.S., they can also prove to be too high for small-cap firms 
seeking access to such venues.125  The reticence of market-makers to 
underwrite offerings below a certain amount also increases entry barriers 
for small firms.126
Second, the recent enlargement of a public equity funding gap in 
Europe and the U.S. also inhibits small-cap firms from listing in 
traditional stock exchanges.127  An increase in listing costs and a reversal 
in market trends after the dot com bubble ruptured exacerbated the 
funding gap.  In the years preceding the downfall of the technology 
market, small firms with high growth potential—particularly high-tech 
or internet-focused companies—could easily obtain equity funding by 
issuing shares in listing venues like NASDAQ or the German Neuer 
level of regulatory stringency for such firms in regards to, inter alia, conflicts of interest 
and related party transactions, director independence, and audit committees).  Both 
exchanges have also set forth multiple listing standards establishing market cap 
thresholds, restrictions on the minimum number of shareholders, track records, and 
similar requirements. See NASDAQ, Inc., Listing Standards & Fees, available at 
http://www.nasdaq.com/about/listing_information.stm (last visited Oct. 7, 2007); NYSE 
Euronext, Listing Standards, available at http://www.nyse.com/regulation/listed/102222 
1392369.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2007). 
 124. See Bainbridge, supra note 69, at 13.  Given the high costs that the U.S. 
regulatory framework imposes on these firms, they may be forced to operate under low 
or even negative profit margins. See id. 
 125. See ABBANAT, supra note 88.  Evidence of this assertion may be found in the 
high number of low-cost stock exchanges currently spawning in Europe. Id. 
 126. See Posting of Dale Oesterle to Business Law Prof Blog, London’s AIM, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2006/08/londons_aim.html#comments 
(Aug. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Oesterle, London’s AIM] (suggesting that underwriters are 
no longer interested in IPOs in which a firm intends to raise amounts below $50 
million, since their fees would not cover their time expenditure). 
 127. See Cruickshank, supra note 107, at 172-73.  However, this private equity gap 
refers to start-ups seeking to raise amounts between £100,000 and £250,000 and not to 
the types of companies that would seek an AIM listing.  These firms have already 
reached a later stage in their growth cycle and, thus, should not be confused with the 
market failure, usually labeled as the “equity gap,” affecting start-ups. See id. at 173. 
Cf. Community Guidelines On State Aid To Promote Risk Capital Investments In Small 
And Medium-Sized Enterprises, 2006 O.J. (C 194) 2 [hereinafter Community 
Guidelines].  Firms in an early growth stage are usually equity-constrained, given the 
existence of sharp information asymmetries between owners and investors, with higher 
risk exposure for the latter. See id. 
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Markt.128  The market collapse at the end of the twentieth century 
marked a turning point, as the European New Markets disappeared and 
IPO volumes floundered on both sides of the Atlantic.129  Not only did 
successful IPOs after the year 2000 significantly drop, the average 
market capitalization for issuing companies increased dramatically.  
Empirical studies of IPO market trends illustrate this point: during the 
previous decade, 62% of the companies engaging in IPOs had a market 
capitalization of less than $200 million, but during 2004-05, only 30% 
fell within that range.130  Table 1 shows the discussed reduction in IPO 
volume. 
TABLE 1 
REDUCTION IN IPO VOLUME 
 
IPO MARKET TRENDS 
Trend (yearly average) 1990s 2001-2003 2004-2005 
Number of IPOs 533 87 225 
% with deal size 
Below $50 Million 
59% 24% 23% 
% with deal size 
Below $200 Million 
62% 28% 30% 
 
Source: ThinkEquity Partners131
 
 
 128. See Aussenegg et al., supra note 121, at 39; see also Goergen et al., supra note 
35, at 8-9. 
 129. See Goergen et al., supra note 35, at 8-9 (focusing on the dissolution of the 
European new markets after 2000). 
 130. See Posting of Michael T. Moe to ThinkBlog, http://www.thinkequity.com/mt-
archive/2006/03/aim_for_the_sta.html (Mar. 27, 2006, 10:02 EST).  The number of 
companies with a market cap under $50 million diminished from 59% to 23% during 
the same periods. 
 131. ThinkEquity Partners, ThinkBlog, (Mar. 2006), http://www.thinkequity.com/mt 
-archive/2006/03/index.html (IPO Market Trends table). 
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Core132 and non-core133 listing requirements in venues such as 
NASDAQ can prevent small companies from listing, or even lead to 
compulsory delisting for non-compliance,134 which adds to the public 
equity funding gap.  The demutualization process of stock exchanges, by 
which such entities become listed companies subject to public 
shareholder scrutiny, also negatively impacts small-cap firms’ choice of 
listing venue.135  As exchanges in Europe and the U.S. demutualize, 
their incentive structures adjust toward a revenue-seeking model, 
excluding some risk-laden small firms seeking to raise low amounts of 
equity through a public issuance.136
The circumstances previously described propelled the emergence of 
new listing venues, tailored to fit the needs of small firms with high-
growth potential.137  Entering the marketplace with a fury,138 these new 
alternative market segments differ from their predecessors (e.g., Neuer 
Markt, NASDAQ during the 1990s).139  The next part traces the rise of 
London’s AIM, the most successful of these listing venues, and provides 
some insight into AIM’s regulatory model. 
III.  THE RISE OF THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT MARKET 
As financial markets race toward convergence and private equity 
and hedge funds rampage across jurisdictions in their quest for absolute 
returns, the success of a London-based “junior” market draws the 
collective attention of international market participants.140  The LSE, 
 132. Cf. Jeffrey H. Harris et al., Off But Not Gone: A Study of NASDAQ De-listings 
4 (Dice Ctr., Working Paper No. 2004-22, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol 
3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=628203 (referring to the NASDAQ stock market).  Core 
requirements can refer to variables such as the minimum number of shareholders, 
market capitalization, and the number of market makers. See id. 
 133. Cf. id.  Non-core variables often refer to minimum market float and bid price in 
a share issuance. See id. 
 134. Harris et al., supra note 132, at 4.  It is important to note that both NASDAQ 
(NASDAQ Capital Market) and the NYSE (NYSE Arca) launched trading platforms 
with lower core and non-core requirements specifically designed for small-cap firms. 
See infra Part III. 
 135. Coffee, Cross-Listings, supra note 92, at 52. 
 136. Id. at 55-56. 
 137. Oesterle, London’s AIM, supra note 126; Moe, supra note 130. 
 138. Moe, supra note 130. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Moe, supra note 130. 
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which set up AIM as a low-cost segment for small companies, draws 
praise from investors, firms, and policy-makers alike, due to AIM’s 
impressive results since 2000.141  Although AIM has been in place for 
over a decade,142 recent market conditions facilitated its unprecedented 
growth, surpassing even mature markets such as NASDAQ and the 
NYSE, according to the number of IPOs since 2004.143  Despite a 
significant slowdown during 2006, AIM still posted 341 IPOs, increased 
its total listed companies to 1,634 (including 306 foreign firms), and 
raised $55 billion.144  AIM even captured the attention of a number of 
U.S. firms that may have previously sought a listing with NASDAQ.145
 141. Id. 
 142. See STÉPHANE ROUSSEAU, THE COMPETITIVENESS OF CANADIAN STOCK 
EXCHANGES: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF THE ALTERNATIVE 
INVESTMENT MARKET 93 (2006) (research study commissioned by the Task Force to 
Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada).  AIM was set up in 1995 after its 
predecessor, the Unlisted Securities Market, floundered in the midst of a severe 
financial downturn brought about by rising interest rates and a recession in the U.K. See 
id.; see also Tim Bauer & J. Efrim Boritz, Report on the UK’s Alternative Investment 
Market – AIM 4 (Nov. 18, 2006) (unpublished working paper), available at 
http://accounting.uwaterloo.ca/research/publications/AIM_Discussion_Paper-rev5.doc 
(explaining that the reduction of the waiting period for companies seeking an LSE 
listing also contributed to the collapse of the Unlisted Securities Market); ABBANAT, 
supra note 88, at 14 (“AIM was first announced in a proposal by the London Stock 
Exchange in April 1994 in response to heavy lobbying from the City Group for Smaller 
Companies (CISCO), led by Sir Ronald Cohen of Apax Partners and Andrew Beeson of 
Beeson Gregory.”). 
 143. See LEONIE BELL ET AL., OXERA CONSULTING LTD., THE COST OF CAPITAL: AN 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 56 (June 2006), available at 
http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/economicresearch (follow “Research Publications” 
hyperlink; then follow “Archived Reports 2000-2006” hyperlink; then follow 
“Download the Cost of Capital published report PDF” hyperlink). But see BELL ET AL., 
supra, at 59-60 (showing that market capitalization in both NASDAQ and the NYSE is 
significantly higher than in AIM); see also Bauer & Boritz, supra note 142, at 5.  AIM 
companies also under-perform NASDAQ and NYSE companies by almost every other 
measurement. Id.  This might be due to the fact that AIM companies are in an earlier 
stage in their growth cycles than the firms listed in NASDAQ or the NYSE. Cf. id. at 6. 
 144. LONDON STOCK EXCH., AIM: SUPPORTING THE GROWTH OF SMALL AND 
MIDCAP COMPANIES 5 (2006), available at http://www.brownrudnick.com/event/pdf/AI 
M_USA_FINAL.pdf; O’MELVENY & MYERS, LLP, THE LSE IS BOOMING – BUT WILL 
THE BUBBLE BURST? 1 (May 2007), available at http://www.omm.com/webdata/content 
/publications/client_alert_communicate_2007_05_21e.htm [hereinafter O’MELVENY & 
MYERS, LLP, LSE] (last visited Nov. 12, 2007). 
 145. See Abulani Lefall, L.A. Firms Lured by Foreign Exchanges; Launching IPOs 
is Easier but U.S. Markets Still Goal, L.A. BUS. J., Apr. 23, 2007 (reporting that fifty-
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AIM’s remarkable growth is not exempt from a certain degree of 
skepticism.  The most caustic critics contend that investors in AIM can 
be easily manipulated and even defrauded, given its sub-optimal 
disclosure and corporate governance standards.146  SEC Commissioner 
Roel Campos recently triggered a media dispute with LSE officials by 
comparing AIM to a casino in which 30% of listed companies 
disappeared a year after gaining admission.147  A majority of detractors 
adopt the milder view that AIM companies only pose a high risk to 
investors, given their reduced dimensions148 and the lack of specific 
hurdles for listing.149  Others simply recall the recent collapse of the 
European New Markets (e.g., the German Neuer Markt) and discard 
AIM’s success as a fleeting phenomenon.150
While some of these negative reviews could be accurate,151 AIM’s 
approach to regulation gives it an edge in the market for small-cap high-
growth companies.152  As a result of this competitive advantage, stock 
exchanges worldwide attempt to replicate AIM’s model.  Europe, for 
instance, has experienced an outbreak of similar trading venues: the 
one U.S. companies had listed on AIM as of Oct. 30, 2006, marking an increase of over 
100% more than the previous year); see also  AIM in a U.S. Context: Exploding Some 
Myths, supra note 115, at 1. 
 146. Iain Dey, You Have to Go Into AIM with Your Eyes Open, THE SUNDAY 
TELEGRAPH (LONDON), June 18, 2006, at 6. 
 147. See AIM Stock Market ‘Like a Casino,’ BBC NEWS, Mar. 9, 2007, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6433637.stm.  Commissioner Campos’ comments 
may have been somewhat exaggerated. See Adam Smith, A Sharp AIM, TIME, Mar. 29, 
2007, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1604485,00.html 
?iid=chix-sphere. 
 148. See, e.g., Herb Greenberg, Is IPO Slowdown a Bad Thing, As Sarbanes-Oxley 
Foes Claim?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 2006, at B4 (arguing that AIM subjects investors to 
heightened risk exposure, due to the characteristics of its companies).  This critique is 
based on profit warning reports issued by some of AIM’s smaller companies during 
2006. Id. 
 149. See David Blackwell & John Gapper, NYSE Chief Says AIM Must Raise 
Standards, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Jan. 27, 2007, at 8.  NYSE’s chief executive officer, 
John Thain, publicly called for more rigid regulation in AIM to prevent an erosion of 
public confidence in the City of London as a main financial center. Id.  Note, however, 
that such criticism may be a result of competitive pressures, as the NYSE, since its 
Euronext takeover, must compete with the LSE for international and European listings. 
Cf. id. 
 150. Dey, supra note 146 (discussing the successes and failures of AIM). 
 151. Id. (stating that there have been a high number of crashes on AIM, including 
Regal Petroleum and Chariot). 
 152. Davidoff, supra note 43, at 45. 
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Borsa Italiana launched its Mercato Expandi in December 2003; the 
analogous Irish Enterprise Exchange was created in April 2005; 
Euronext has been promoting its Alternext segment since 2005; the 
Deutsche Börse set forth its Entry Standard segment in December 2005, 
and the Nordic OMX introduced its First North segment last year.153  
AIM’s model has also served as a prototype for the New Zealand 
Alternative Market, which launched in November 2003, and for the 
trading platform currently under design by the Singapore Stock 
Exchange.154  While these fledging venues might be able to emulate 
AIM’s achievements, it seems unlikely, since AIM owes its staggering 
success to a wealth of interlinked elements not present elsewhere. 
A.  Supply and Demand—The Causes of Aim’s Success 
AIM has thrived in recent years, due to a series of interrelated 
events.  Following the turn of the twenty-first century, London continues 
to rise in prominence among the world’s most important international 
financial centers, amassing large pools of liquidity and gathering 
specialists in multiple fields: investment banks, underwriters, 
institutional investors, and foreign and domestic companies.  London’s 
increasing sophistication as a provider of financial services results from 
a decades-long reform movement intended to transform the city into a 
competitive venue.155  The results of this comprehensive overhaul are 
manifest; a study released in June 2007 proclaimed that London deposed 
New York as the leading financial services hub in the world.156  Several 
 153. See BOARD ET AL., supra note 75, at 185.  Other examples in the same region 
include the Guernsey Stock Exchange, the Nordic Growth Market in Sweden, the Local 
Business Exchange in Birmingham, and the M: Access in Munich. Id. 
 154. See Ass’n of Small and Medium Enters., 3rd Board Listing: A Viable 
Alternative for SMEs Looking for Growth?, ENTREPRENEURS’ DIG., available at 
http://www.asme.org.sg/subpage.aspx?pageName=digest.  Listing venues specializing 
in smaller companies have also spawned in Central and South America.  However, 
these new market segments feature more stringent corporate governance and disclosure 
standards than the corresponding main markets.  Brazil’s Novo Mercado and Costa 
Rica’s Mercado Alternativo para Acciones appear to be less modeled on AIM than on 
the now extinct German Neuer Markt. See Davidoff, supra note 43, at 50. 
 155. See London as a Financial Centre: Capital City, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 21, 
2006. 
 156. See Chia-Peck Wong, London Tops as World Commerce Center, Says 
Mastercard, BLOOMBERG NEWS, June 12, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news 
?pid=newsarchive&sid=af92ReNSibw4.  The index used for this study combined “six 
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ingredients, including a sophisticated corporate governance system, an 
efficient regulator embodied in the Financial Services Authority, an 
aggressive marketing campaign, and the increase of regulatory costs in 
the U.S., contributed to London’s outranking of New York as the 
leading center for finance.157
The LSE profits vastly from this upward trend, outstripping even its 
main competitor, the NYSE, in number of IPOs and money raised 
through initial offerings in 2006.158  AIM capitalized on London’s 
success, evidenced by its IPO volume, its number of listed companies, 
and its share issuances, each of which surged at an almost exponential 
rate over the past few years.159  Yet, AIM is not merely a free-rider on 
London’s and the LSE’s reputation.  Rather, AIM succeeds because it 
supplies a scarce product to the marketplace: rapid, low-cost access to 
public equity for small firms with high growth potential.160  London’s 
status as one of the world’s leading financial hubs simply adds to AIM’s 
prominence and success. 
Following the enactment of SOX and the burst of the dot com 
bubble, the regulatory costs of equity financing through U.S. capital 
markets skyrocketed.161  Small-cap companies were disproportionately 
measures of commercial power including flows of finance, volumes of business and the 
creation and dissemination of knowledge.  It was developed by a team of academics 
specializing in economics, business, urban studies and finance.” See Beattie, supra note 
76. 
 157. See International Equity Cross-Listing and Corporate Governance, CAIR 
NEWSL. (Manchester Bus. Sch., Manchester, U.K.), Dec. 2006, at 1, available at 
http://www.mbs.ac.uk/Research/analysisinvestment/documents/CAIRNewsletter21-11-
06.pdf. 
 158. O’MELVENY & MYERS, LLP, LSE, supra note 144. 
 159. ROUSSEAU, supra note 142, at 92 (“Being based in London, AIM enables 
resource companies to enter a sophisticated market that provides both a source of 
capital and a community of knowledgeable professionals.”).  London brings together 
different elements that create optimal conditions for a market like AIM to develop—a 
large pool of liquidity, a sophisticated marketplace, and a flexible and efficient legal 
system. See id. 
 160. See London Stock Exch., About AIM, http://www.londonstockexchange.com/e 
n-gb/products/companyservices/ourmarkets/aim_new/About+AIM/ (“To join AIM, 
companies do not need a particular financial track record or trading history.  There is 
also no minimum requirement in terms of size or number of shareholders.  This more 
flexible approach reflects the fact that AIM was designed specifically for smaller 
growing companies.”).
 161. Scott Liebs, Five Years and Accounting, CFO.COM, July 1, 2007, 
http://www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/9393501/c_9394789?f=options. 
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affected by this cost increase in Europe and the U.S.162  Consequently, 
small firms seeking to raise capital through financial markets turned 
away from more traditional listing venues such as NASDAQ and started 
favoring exchanges which provided expeditious and low-cost access to 
equity financing.163  Despite the existence of several venues that 
specialize in small-cap firms, AIM was the first-mover in supplying the 
marketplace with a lower regulatory burden, while enhancing listed 
companies’ reputations and providing access to institutional investors 
seeking firms with long-term growth potential. 
Furthermore, as the primary U.S. stock exchanges demutualized in 
order to become public companies themselves, their incentive structures 
recalibrated into a revenue-seeking model that, to some degree, excluded 
risk-laden small firms trying to raise low amounts of equity through a 
public issuance.164  A reversal in IPO market trends also adversely 
impacted small-cap firms.165  These factors exacerbated the public 
equity funding gap, which affects companies with a low market 
capitalization.166  While the average market capitalization for an AIM 
 162. See Posting of Dan Oesterle to Business Law Prof Blog, Cross-Listing 
Premiums, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/archives.html (Apr. 27, 
2007) [hereinafter Oesterle, Cross-Listing Premiums] (explaining that small companies 
are reluctant to bear such high costs to obtain a mere “seal of approval” regarding their 
corporate governance and disclosure standards).  Oesterle’s metaphor clearly portrays 
the problem: 
[The U.S. established] a very high standard of reporting that only very large, well run 
companies can use as a ‘seal of approval.’  It makes sense for them to do so; smaller 
and medium companies with more average business practices no longer find is [sic] 
sensible to incur the high costs of using the ‘seal.’ 
Id. 
 163. See London Stock Exch., About AIM, supra note 160 (“Since its launch in 
1995, over 2,500 companies have joined AIM − raising more than £34 [billion] in the 
process.”). 
 164. See Oesterle, London’s AIM, supra note 126. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Cf. Cruickshank, supra note 107 (arguing that the “public equity funding gap” 
arises from a disparity between the demand of low-cap firms that require smaller 
investments and the market supply of such investments).  This phenomenon is 
somewhat different to the “equity gap” market failure that affects firms in the initial 
stages of their growth cycles. Id.  The equity gap is commonly present in start-ups in 
which “high transactional and monitoring costs associated with early stage ventures 
make them unattractive for investment.” See Jimmy Schwarzkopf & Moren Lévesque, 
Closing the “Equity Gap” in Startup/Seed Investment for ICT Ventures: The Israeli 
Experience (unpublished), available at http://www.mansci.uwaterloo.ca/~levesque/pape 
rs/Schwarzkopf%20&%20Levesque.pdf.  However, the equity gap can also affect 
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company is close to $70 million, NASDAQ’s average is closer to $1 
billion; the NYSE’s average exceeds both figures.167  Thus, AIM 
currently supplies access to the capital market vis-à-vis an increasing 
demand for equity funding by companies with low market 
capitalization.168  While NASDAQ formerly covered this market 
segment, particularly during the 1990s with respect to high-tech low-cap 
firms,169 it has since matured, shifting its focus to larger firms.170  
Consequently, undersized companies in the U.S. that might have trouble 
enterprises in later growth stages.  This apparently led the European Commission to 
issue a set of guidelines concerning state aid to reduce the equity gap for small, high-
growth companies. See Community Guidelines, supra note 127.  Interestingly, an 
accompanying memorandum even references “alternative stock markets specialized in 
SMEs including high-growth companies.” Memorandum from Eur. Comm’n on 
Guidelines on State Aid to Promote Risk Capital Investment in SMEs (Memo. No. 
06/295) (July 19, 2006), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?ref 
erence=MEMO/06/295&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
 167. See AIM in a U.S. Context: Exploding Some Myths, supra note 115, at 3; see 
also Rick Kennedy, Law Firms take Aim at IPOs Listing Overseas, SAN FRANCISCO 
DAILY J., Dec. 8, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.reedsmith.com/_db/_documents/S 
F_Daily_Journal_120806.pdf (“The average market capitalization of a company on the 
NASDAQ is $1.2 billion, and on the AIM it is $89 million.”).  It is also important to 
note that both NASDAQ and the NYSE set strict track record requirements for initial 
listing and thresholds for continued listing.  Any failure to comply with such 
requirements will result in either a rejection of initial listing or a forced delisting 
following a verification process. See NASDAQ, Inc., Listing Standards & Fees, supra 
note 123; NYSE Euronext, Listing Standards, supra note 123. 
 168. See Friedman & Grose, supra note 103, at 23; Doidge et al., supra note 1, at 42 
(“If anything has changed in the aftermath of SOX, it is that the non-listed firms have 
become smaller and are therefore less likely to list on the U.S. exchanges or the Main 
Market in London.”).  The authors further contend that it is firm size, rather than a 
reduction in the attractiveness of U.S. capital markets, that has led to a shift in cross-
listings. Id. 
 169. See Robert E. Grady, The Sarbox Monster, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2007, at A19.  
In 1996, the average market capitalization for a tech-company undergoing a NASDAQ 
IPO was close to $130 million. See id.  Some historical figures shed further light on the 
evolution of NASDAQ share offerings: Intel’s 1970 IPO consisted of $8 million in 
issued shares and a market cap of $53 million, and Cisco Systems raised only $50 
million in 1990 and reached a market cap of $226 million. See id. 
 170. See OSBORNE CLARK, IS AIM THE NEW NASDAQ? 4 (2006) [hereinafter IS AIM 
THE NEW NASDAQ?]; see also Susan Arterian Chang, Tech Start-ups Spurn NASDAQ 
for London, IEEE SPECTRUM, Dec. 6, 2007, available at http://spectrum.ieee.org/dec06/ 
4752 (“The NASDAQ Electronic Market, founded in 1971, for many years offered U.S. 
entrepreneurs access to public equity.  But these days NASDAQ is setting its sights on 
larger corporations, the likes of Google and Microsoft.”). 
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obtaining a NASDAQ listing may flock to AIM.171  As of June 2007, 
sixty-three U.S. firms worth $11 billion had successfully completed an 
AIM listing.172  Figure 2 shows the different market capitalization focus 
between NASDAQ and AIM and what has been called the “AIM sweet 
spot.”173
FIGURE 2 
AIM VS NASDAQ—COMPARATIVE MARKET CAP FOCUS 
 
 
Source: IS AIM THE NEW NASDAQ, supra note 170. 
 
The state of affairs in Europe also contributed to a climate in which 
AIM has been able to prosper.  In an effort to imitate NASDAQ’s 
experience in attracting high growth companies with a relatively low 
market capitalization, several European stock exchanges launched 
specialized market segments during the 1990s.  Europe’s experiment 
with market design led to the creation of venues featuring elevated 
regulatory requirements, including high disclosure and conformance to 
international accounting standards.174  The first of these venues aimed at 
start-up, high-growth enterprises was the pan-European stock market 
 171. IS AIM THE NEW NASDAQ?, supra note 170, at 13. 
 172. See infra Part III.C. 
 173. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 927 n.59 
(2006).  This divergence in market cap focus allows AIM to capture trading that would 
otherwise be done on NASDAQ. See id. 
 174. See Laura Botazzi & Marco Da Rin, Europe’s New Stock Markets (Ctr. for 
Econ. Pol’y Res., Discussion Paper No. 3521, 2002). 
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EASDAQ, which began trading in November, 1996.175  Subsequent 
attempts to emulate NASDAQ’s model led to the creation of the Neuer 
Markt sponsored by the Deutsche Börse, the Paris Stock Exchange’s 
Nouveau Marché, the Italian Nuovo Mercato, the New Market of 
Amsterdam Exchanges, and the Euro NM Brussels, among others.  
Although these new markets might have temporarily reduced the public 
equity funding gap, their ultimate failure paved the way for AIM to 
capture a substantial portion of the market for small-cap funding.176  
Table 2 shows the dates in which the European New Markets were 
launched and subsequently closed. 
 
TABLE 2 
RISE AND FALL OF THE EUROPEAN NEW MARKETS 
 
EUROPEAN NEW MARKETS 
Market Country Opening Date Closing Date 
Alternative 
Investment Market 
UK June 19, 1995 N/A 
Nouveau Marché France February 14, 1996 Eurolist as of 
February 21, 2005 
EASDAQ 
(renamed 
NASDAQ Europe) 
Pan-European June, 1996 November 28, 
2003 
Neuer Markt Germany March 10, 1997 December 31, 
2003 
NMAX  Netherlands March 25, 1997 Eurolist as of 
April 4, 2005 
Euro NM Brussels Belgium April 11, 1997 October 2000 
Nuovo Mercato Italy June 17 , 1999 MTAX as of 
Sept. 19, 1995 
Source: BOARD ET AL., supra note 75. 
 
 175. See Steven Weber & Elliot Posner, Creating a Pan-European Equity Market: 
The Origins of EASDAQ, 7 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 529, 529 (2000). 
 176. See Hans-Peter Burghof & Adrian Hunger, Access to Stock Markets for Small 
and Medium Sized Growth Firms: The Temporary Success and Ultimate Failure of 
Germany’s Neuer Markt (Oct. 2003) (unpublished working paper), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=497404; BOARD ET AL., supra note 
75; Botazzi & Da Rin, supra note 174; Goergen et al., supra note 35 (offering a detailed 
analysis concerning the deficiencies of the European New Markets, including IPO 
underpricing, offerings with negative initial returns, and negative cumulative abnormal 
returns). 
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AIM’s success can also be attributed to its ability to avoid some of 
the most significant factors responsible for the collapse of the European 
New Markets.  For instance, the New Markets narrowly focused on 
high-tech companies, whose massive downturn during the dot com 
bubble burst helped bring about their demise.177  AIM companies’ 
broader range of economic activities could be what allowed it to endure 
the demise of the technology sector worldwide.178  Whereas the 
NASDAQ of the 1990s and the European New Markets focused 
primarily on technology stocks, AIM extended its scope to include firms 
engaging in all sorts of industrial activities, such as mining, oil and gas, 
and real estate (see Figure 3 below).179  To ensure adequate compliance 
with reporting rules in this highly diversified environment, thereby 
protecting investor confidence in the market, AIM issues specialized 
notices for certain sectors that require technical guidance in interpreting 
disclosure requirements.180  For instance, after Regal Petroleum’s shares 
plummeted following fruitless oil exploration activities off the Greek 
coast,181 AIM issued a Guidance Note requiring independent reports for 
reserves in admission documents and periodical market updates.182  This 
 177. See Friedman & Grose, supra note 103, at 21.  The authors attribute AIM’s 
success largely to a matter of timing. Id.  However, this interpretation fails to fully 
recognize the fact that AIM did not depend exclusively on the technology sector to 
survive. 
 178. See Mark Landler, German Technology Stock Market To Be Dissolved, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2002, at W1 (asserting that the burst of the dot com bubble had a 
negative impact on some European New Markets, such as the German Neuer Markt, 
and contributed significantly to their decline). 
 179. Cf. London Stock Exch., techMARK: A Focus on Innovation, 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/techmark (last visited Sept. 21, 2007).  In the 
midst of the dot com bubble, NASDAQ and other European New Markets impinged on 
AIM’s relevance in the technology sector.  In response, the LSE launched a specialized 
market segment, techMARK, to focus exclusively on tech stocks.  TechMARK was 
launched in November 1999 as a segment of the LSE’s Main Market.  Despite this new 
segment’s relative success, there appears to be little or no overlap with AIM companies 
since techMARK targets larger enterprises. See id. 
 180. See London Stock Exch., AIM Rules for Companies, pt. 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.spgmedia.com/documents/AIMRULESFORCOMPANIES_2007.pdf 
[hereinafter AIM Rules for Companies]. 
 181. See Heather Connon, Don’t Panic If Your Fund Manager Slips Up, GUARDIAN 
UNLIMITED, Jan. 29, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2006/jan/29/fundsbondstr 
usts.investments. 
 182. See London Stock Exch., AIM Rules – Guidance Note for Mining, Oil and Gas 
Companies (2006), available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/01 
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close monitoring of market developments allows AIM to promptly 
adjust some of its rules to better suit its broad base of “customers” (i.e., 
investors and listed companies). 
 
FIGURE 3 
SECTOR DISTRIBUTION OF AIM COMPANIES 
 
Source: ThinkEquity Partners, supra note 131. 
 
AIM has thus far eluded another likely cause for the failure of the 
New Markets, the German Neuer Markt in particular—an apparent lack 
of sophistication of both investors and regulatory authorities.183  AIM’s 
privileged location in London, the LSE’s reputation as a sophisticated 
exchange, and the sophistication of the investors driven to AIM184 all 
B3C887-9559-458C-B19B-B41A6E641F9B/0/FinalGuidanceMOG.pdf. 
 183. See Friedman & Grose, supra note 103, at 21. 
 184. See Excerpt to INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN AIM 2006, GROWTH COMPANY 
INVESTOR (Teather & Greenwood, London, U.K.), available at http://www.londonstock 
exchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/E416463D-CB0B-4949-B33E-8F7DAFD3DAAA/0/Instit 
utionalInvestors4pp2006.pdf (explaining that given the risks associated with low-cap 
companies and the relative illiquidity of AIM shares, owners of AIM stock are mostly 
sophisticated institutional investors that seek long-term positions); Clara Furse, Taking 
AIM at Small Caps, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2007, at 15. Although individual retail 
investors are also encouraged to participate in AIM (AIM offers incentives in the form 
of tax benefits), senior investors are the most common market players. See Daniel 
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permit the exchange to succeed.  Although some defects of the New 
Markets may exist, like IPO underpricing, the fact that AIM outlived 
and outperformed most of its New Market counterparts suggests its 
continued success.185
Recent changes in the European Union’s policy agenda have also 
contributed to the growth of AIM.  Traditionally, European firms have 
relied on banks as the primary source of financing, due to the privileged 
standing of credit institutions across the different Member States.186  
Small companies expose banks to high-growth potential as well as 
riskier financing conditions.187  Accordingly, these companies are 
charged higher interest rates and must abide by more stringent 
conditions when applying for debt financing.188  The International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (the Basel 
II Accords) aggravated this situation by reducing the availability of 
financial credit for small and medium-sized enterprises.189  As the 
European Union moves away from a bank-based system and toward an 
equity-oriented system, small and medium-sized firms turn to capital 
markets—”growth” stock exchanges in particular—to obtain public 
Thomas, AIM Promises the World Property Shares: Property Companies Are Homing 
In on the ‘Junior’ Market, FIN. TIMES, June 2, 2007, at 8. 
 185. See Goergen et al., supra note 35 (discussing how the Member States’ inability 
to harmonize different sets of listing rules, the involvement of multiple national 
regulators, and inefficient cross-border trading led the Belgian, Dutch and French 
markets to merge, forming Euronext in 2000 and breaking up several of the New 
Markets); NASDAQ Europe to Close, BBC NEWS, June 26, 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3024558.stm (arguing that EASDAQ’s poor 
performance paved the way for a successful takeover by NASDAQ in 2001, leading to 
the creation of NASDAQ Europe, and that NASDAQ’s subsequent inability to improve 
NASDAQ Europe’s results eventually led to a closing of European operations in 2003); 
Davidoff, supra note 43, at 50 (asserting that high profile scandals and issuer 
implosions led to the demise of the German Neuer Markt and its 2003 absorption into 
Germany’s primary market).  The French Nouveau Marché disappeared after the 
introduction of the AIM-like Alternext segment by Euronext in 2005.  Finally, the 
Italian Nuovo Mercato was replaced by the STAR segment.  Italy also introduced 
Mercato Expandi, a listing venue similar to AIM. See Goergen et al., supra note 35, at 
7-8. 
 186. See Franklin Allen, Laura Bartiloro & Oskar Kowalewski, The Financial 
System of the E.U. 25 (2005) (unpublished working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=871454. 
 187. See OXFORD ANALYTICA, supra note 108, at 4. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See id. at 12. 
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financing.190  AIM captured a large number of these companies by 
supplying expedited, low-cost access to equity,191 made possible through 
its unique regulatory model.192
B.  AIM’s Regulatory Model 
AIM is an exchange-regulated venue featuring an array of 
principles-based rules for publicly held companies.  The genius of 
AIM’s regulatory model lies with the comply-or-explain option provided 
to each listed company to adapt to the exchange’s flexible and reduced 
set of rules.193  Flexibility notwithstanding, rule-tailoring is not a 
reckless process governed by firms’ self-interest.  While granting 
companies regulatory compliance leeway, the exchange also mandates 
continuous oversight and advice by a private party—the Nominated 
Adviser (“Nomad”).194  The Nomads’ role is central to AIM’s regulatory 
model, as these entities act as gatekeepers, advisers, and regulators of 
AIM-listed companies.195  In advising each firm’s rule selection and 
compliance, Nomads enable firms to abide by tailor-made regulation, 
reducing regulatory costs in the process.196  Further, a unique incentive 
structure constrains Nomads from inattentively performing this role.197  
Specifically, Nomads bear significant damages for tolerating 
misdemeanors on behalf of their supervised companies, including the 
loss of “reputational capital.”198  Accordingly, AIM can be considered a 
“reputational market,” in which investors rely on the standing of 
 190. Cf. id. at 8-9. 
 191. See id. at 16. 
 192. Cf. id. at 15-16. 
 193. Id.  Listed companies have some freedom to interpret the principles-based rules 
contained in AIM’s regulatory documents.  AIM companies may conclude, for instance, 
that certain rules do not apply to them, or even decide the way in which to abide by 
certain disclosure requirements.  This process of interpretation and selection is 
conducted jointly with the Nominated Advisers, which decreases the likelihood of firms 
behaving in an opportunistic manner in regards to their obligations as listed companies. 
See generally FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, THE COMBINED CODE ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 1-2 (2006), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/documents/pagemanager/ 
frc/Combined%20code%202006%20OCTOBER.pdf. 
 194. See id. at 15. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See id. at 15-16. 
 197. See generally Coffee, Gatekeeper, supra note 48 (explaining gatekeepers’ 
incentive structures in financial markets). 
 198. See generally id. 
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Nomads as a proxy for the quality of listed companies, rather than on the 
market’s regulation.199
The nature of an exchange-regulated market segment permits 
AIM’s model of self-imposed rules.200  As such, AIM escapes most of 
the mandatory provisions contained in European Union directives—as 
implemented in the U.K.—and other rules applicable to companies listed 
in the LSE.201  Self-regulation is pivotal to AIM’s low regulatory burden 
for several reasons: (1) companies seeking an AIM listing are not 
subject to significant admission requirements;202 (2) after admission is 
granted, the ongoing obligations with which firms must comply are 
comparatively lower than those that govern larger exchanges; and (3) 
corporate governance provisions are not mandatory for AIM 
companies.203  Despite this light regime, most AIM firms voluntarily 
subject themselves to higher corporate governance and disclosure 
standards, due largely to Nomads’ advice and pressure from institutional 
investors.204  Again, this intentional abidance by higher standards does 
 199. See Davidoff, supra note 43, at 45. 
 200. See generally Pritchard, supra note 5 (arguing that, if left to their own devices, 
exchanges are likely to find an optimal balance between regulatory costs and investor 
protection); Ernest Badway & Jonathan M. Busch, Ending Securities Industry Self-
Regulation As We Know It, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1351 (2005) (providing an analysis of 
self-regulation). 
 201. See Council Directive 2003/71, 2003 O.J. (L 345) (Prospectus Directive).  The 
Prospectus Directive sets out financial reporting requirements and informs that since 
2004, AIM is not considered a “regulated market” for the purposes of European 
Directives.  AIM, in light of its exemption from particular provisions under the 
Prospectus Directive, grants listed status after submission of a simple admission 
document, instead of a prospectus. See id.; see also AccountingWEB, Combined Code 
on Corporate Governance—Overview, Oct. 27, 2003, http://www.accountingweb.co.uk/ 
cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=119232 (stating that the U.K.’s Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance (2003) is not applicable to AIM-listed companies, although they may 
voluntarily adopt the provisions contained therein). 
 202. See OXFORD ANALYTICA, supra note 108, at 15. 
 203. See IS AIM THE NEW NASDAQ?, supra note 170, at 8. 
 204. See OSBORNE CLARK, WHY U.S. (AND NON-EUROPEAN COMPANIES) NEED AIM 
(2005), available at http://www.casestudyagency.com/clientwork/OC_AIM_05.pdf 
(explaining that institutional investors expect AIM-listed companies to abide by high 
standards of disclosure and corporate governance); Monitoring and Taking Action on 
Financial Performance, Corporate Governance and Corporate Responsibility, U.K. 
RESPONSIBLE INV. POL’Y (Henderson Global Invs.), Apr. 2007, available at 
http://www.henderson.com/home/uk/governance/responsible_investment/ (follow link 
to “U.K. Responsible Investment Policy”). 
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not raise regulatory costs to main market levels, since AIM firms still 
benefit from customized compliance.205
Another important element of AIM’s model is the composition of 
its investor base.  While few are start-ups, a majority of AIM-listed 
companies have not yet reached the later, less risk-laden stages of their 
growth cycles.206  This could prove hazardous for unsophisticated 
investors who lack both the knowledge and resources to conduct proper 
inquiries into a firm’s prospects and activities.207  Consequently, wealthy 
individuals with experience in securities trading, institutional investors, 
and entities specializing in AIM investments comprise most of AIM’s 
investor base,208 including financial powerhouses such as JP Morgan, 
Merrill Lynch, and Goldman Sachs, and investment funds like Fidelity 
and Artemis Investments.209  AIM has been aptly labeled as a “junior” 
market for “senior” investors.210  The venue’s location in London and 
the large role played by institutional investors there favors this 
situation.211  Still, the LSE does attract more retail investors to AIM by 
offering certain advantages, including tax breaks for individuals that 
invest in its low-tier market segment.212
 205. See OXFORD ANALYTICA, supra note 108, at 15-16. 
 206. See Bauer & Boritz, supra note 142, at 12.  Though initially launched as a 
market for low-caps, AIM is maturing, now turning its focus to mid-caps, whose 
numbers in AIM have quadrupled since 2004. See id. at 4. 
 207. See S. M. Solaiman, Disclosure Philosophy for Investor Protection in 
Securities Markets: Does One Size Fit All?, 28 COMPANY LAW. 139 (May 2007) 
(stressing the importance of considering the level of sophistication of investors in 
regards to stock exchanges and securities regulation).  “Information and transaction 
costs tend to be far more serious when it comes to doing business with unsophisticated 
retail costumers, who may be poorly informed or find it difficult to shop around, 
making them ripe for picking by unscrupulous operators.” Id. 
 208. See NICK ELLIS, COLLINS STEWART PLC, AIM: THE ROLE OF A NOMAD (2007), 
available at http://www.ukinvest.gov.uk/Financial-services/4009261/en-GB.html. 
 209. See Excerpt to INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN AIM 2007, GROWTH COMPANY 
INVESTOR (Landsbanki, London, U.K.), available at http://www.londonstockexchange.c 
om/NR/rdonlyres/3B4D7EF6-0CFD-4DCE-B2FD-7B116D84E766/0/INSTITUTIONA 
L_INVESTORS.pdf; see also LONDON STOCK EXCH., AIM MARKET STATISTICS: APR. 
2007 (2007), available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/en-gb/about/statistics/ 
factsheets/aimmarketstats.htm (follow link to “April 2007”). 
 210. See Thomas, supra note 184, at 1. 
 211. See Friedman & Grose, supra note 103, at 21 (pointing out that while the U.K. 
has an institutional investor-focused system, in the U.S. retail investors play a larger 
role in securities markets). 
 212. See, e.g., AIM in a U.S. Context: Exploding Some Myths, supra note 115, at 5 
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The fact that most AIM companies have not reached a significant 
stage in their growth cycle impacts the venue’s liquidity ratio.  A 
significant number of companies that seek an AIM listing expect to raise 
capital in amounts sufficient to allow them, at a later date, to list in a 
larger exchange or undergo takeover proceedings.213  Most of these 
companies even rely on post-IPO funding rounds in AIM to raise 
sufficient amounts of equity.214  Hence, AIM firms seldom provide 
investors with short-term profits.  As investors expect long-term gains 
from their participation in AIM companies, they pour considerable 
resources into analyzing a firm’s prospects and would loath liquidating 
their shares before payoff.215  Accordingly, AIM shares are not actively 
traded.216
(discussing how retail investors that acquire AIM shares are offered a tax incentive if 
they hold their investment for a certain amount of time).  This incentive, provided in the 
capital gains tax toll, decreases to 50% of the total gain after one year and to 25% after 
two years. Id.  Private investors generally only acquire AIM shares after an IPO, since 
securities in initial public offerings are often totally acquired by institutional investors. 
See id.  Other fiscal breaks relate to inheritance taxes, enterprise investment schemes, 
and venture capital trusts. See Tom Bulford, Should You Invest in AIM?, MONEYWEEK, 
Apr. 7, 2006, http://www.moneyweek.com/file/11116/should-you-invest-in-aim.html. 
 213. See Bauer & Boritz, supra note 142, at 4.  A majority of delistings in AIM are 
due to either a listing move to a senior exchange, like the LSE, or company takeover or 
reverse takeover proceedings.  Bauer points out that only a reduced number of firms de-
list because their shares have lost considerable value. See id. at 4.  It is relevant to note 
that AIM’s Rules appear to take particular interest in regulating takeovers and 
significant corporate transactions. See AIM Rules for Companies, supra note 180, Rules 
12-16, at 5-7. 
 214. See AIM in a U.S. Context: Exploding Some Myths, supra note 115, at 5.  This 
practice, which is customary in AIM, may be compared to the multiple funding rounds 
in venture capital investments. See id.  The main difference between both types of 
funding lies with the absence of typical venture capital restrictions and the reliance on 
market mechanisms to govern the relationship between AIM companies and their 
investors. Id. 
 215. See id.  Investors in AIM have a longer investment time horizon than investors 
in the U.S.  The former often take large positions and hold them until they are certain to 
obtain a significant return in their investment. See id. 
 216. See Davidoff, supra note 43, at 44.  During 2006, average trading volumes for 
AIM companies were only two percent of NASDAQ companies. Id.  This liquidity 
constraint is certainly a consequence of AIM investors’ long-term profit goals, as 
evidenced by the characteristics of the companies in which they invest.  Since these 
companies are frequently unable to deliver short term returns, investors focus on 
reaping profits after a period of at least twelve months. See AIM in a U.S. Context: 
Exploding Some Myths, supra note 115, at 5. 
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Critics of AIM’s regulatory model point to these liquidity 
constraints as a signal of the venue’s imminent collapse.217  However 
adverse low trading volumes might be, AIM provides its companies with 
a relatively higher level of liquidity, as compared to other listing venues.  
Hypothetically, companies that list their shares in AIM would be more 
thinly traded in exchanges such as NASDAQ or the LSE’s Official 
List.218  A study in 2007, comparing firms with a market capitalization 
below $450 million, also shows that AIM is at least as liquid as the 
LSE’s Official List.219  Recently, AIM has implemented numerous 
measures that could improve the venue’s liquidity ratio, such as the AIM 
50, AIM 100, and AIM-All Share indices, AIM index trackers, and 
specialized trading platforms such as the SETSmm220 and PLUS.221  As 
AIM evolves into a more mature market, it must continue to address 
liquidity constraints. 
The oversight roles of its own regulation service, and that of the 
LSE, also play a part in the success of AIM’s model.  Both have proven 
 217. See Friedman & Grose, supra note 103, at 6.  Liquidity constraints are one of 
the main factors that deter the development of vibrant capital markets.  Higher liquidity 
levels increase trading opportunities by attracting a higher number of listings, thus 
increasing market activity. See id.  Low liquidity is common in systems with lower 
levels of regulatory stringency. See Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, Economies, 
Capital Markets and Securities Law 39 (Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 73, 2006); 
Davidoff, supra note 43, at 44. 
 218. See IS AIM THE NEW NASDAQ?, supra note 170, at 7.  Since investors in AIM 
companies are usually institutional investors seeking long term gains, they are less 
pressed to sell their holdings and, thus, benefit less from enhanced liquidity. See Bauer 
& Boritz, supra note 142, at 12. 
 219. See Initial Public Offerings on AIM for U.S. Corporations, A TAYLOR WESSING 
GUIDE (Taylor Wessing, London, U.K.), 2007, at 3, available at http://www.taylorwess 
ing.com/website/generator/taylorwessing/content/publications/items/UK/InitialPublicOf
fersAIMforUSCorporations__TWUK__english.en,property=file.pdf. 
 220. See id.  AIM 50, AIM 100 and AIM-All Share are market capitalization 
weighted indices tracking the largest 50, 100, and all AIM companies, respectively.  
SETSmm is an order book service provided by the LSE, which guarantees two-way 
prices for trading parties. See London Stock Exchange, http://www.londonstockexchang 
e.com/aim/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2008). 
 221. See Quoted Companies Alliance, Guide to U.K. Markets, 
http://www.quotedcompaniesalliance.co.uk/market_comparison.asp (last visited Jan. 
16, 2008) (comparing AIM and PLUS).  PLUS is a self-regulated U.K. market which 
tailors its regulation to the needs of both investors and growing companies.  Although 
PLUS is not meant to be a tool for improving AIM’s liquidity—since to some extent it 
is the latter’s competitor—PLUS does contemplate special proceedings for AIM 
companies’ cross-listings, which may enhance liquidity for AIM traded shares. Cf. id. 
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to be highly responsive regulators, adjusting AIM’s rules promptly and 
according to market need.  Constant regulatory fine-tuning has allowed 
the venue to counter its most mordant critics by expeditiously fixing any 
detected glitches.  The exchange’s reaction to adverse media reports in 
early 2006 concerning cash shells listed on AIM with no real business 
purpose exemplifies its vigilance.  On March 17, 2006, the exchange set 
a deadline for investing companies that had raised at least ₤3 million on 
AIM, but had not yet put those funds to any use.222  Upon expiration of 
the deadline, the exchange immediately suspended thirty-eight 
companies from trading.223  Recently, the exchange also introduced a 
new rulebook for Nomads to ensure a consistent level of good 
practice.224  Notices published on the exchange’s website tweak AIM’s 
rules and regulations process.225  Twenty-nine different notices have 
been published to date (February 2008) and concern all sorts of matters, 
including clearing and settlement conducted through the CREST system, 
disciplinary procedures, permissible accounting standards, and 
amendments to AIM’s Rules for Companies.226  In February 2007, the 
exchange launched a major regulatory overhaul, including issuing the 
new rulebook for Nomads,227 mandating that AIM companies maintain a 
website for disclosure purposes, and refining its disciplinary 
proceedings.228
 222. See London Stock Exch., AIM Notice No. 17: AIM Rules – Reminder of 
Investing Company Rules, (Mar. 17, 2006), available at http://www.londonstockexchan 
ge.com/NR/rdonlyres/E0B87D50-F0A1-4BD7-ADCD-EAF5942421B2/0/AIMNotice 
17.doc. 
 223. See Bauer & Boritz, supra note 142, at 10. 
 224. See Confirmation of New Aim Rules and Feedback on AIM’s Notice 24, 
CORPORATE UPDATE (Clifford Chance, London, U.K.), May 2007, available at 
http://www.cliffordchance.com/expertise/publications/details.aspx?FilterName=@URL
&LangID=UK&contentitemid=12138. 
 225. See London Stock Exch., AIM Notices, http://www.londonstockexchange.com/ 
en-gb/products/companyservices/ourmarkets/aim_new/For+AIM+Advisers/aimnotices. 
htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2008). 
 226. See id. 
 227. See London Stock Exch., AIM Notice No. 27: Confirmation of New Rules and 
Feedback on AIM Notice 27 (Feb. 20, 2007), available at http://www.londonstockexch 
ange.com/NR/rdonlyres/91B19E7D-550C-440A-BCCA-52A32F1913DB/0/AIMRULE 
SFORCOMPANIES_2007.pdf.  The new rules enhance the eligibility criteria for 
Nomads and lay down core responsibilities. See id. 
 228. See id. 
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1.  Listing Process 
In contrast with the majority of exchanges worldwide, AIM does 
not impose stringent admission requirements on companies seeking 
entry to the market.  The few objective listing criteria set forth by the 
exchange can be complied with easily; admittance simply requires firms 
to appoint a Nomad and submit an admission document.229  Although 
these requirements, at first glance, might seem excessively lax, AIM 
listings are subject to a safeguard that ensures market integrity and 
contributes to the preservation of AIM’s reputation.  In the absence of 
minimum capitalization, share volume thresholds, and trading track 
record requirements,230 AIM charges Nomads with the task of certifying 
firms that request admission.231  Certification can only be issued after 
firms have passed a suitability test designed by AIM and administered 
by Nomads.232  Although Nomads have significant discretion in 
determining which companies pass the suitability test, AIM’s Rules for 
 
 229. See London Stock Exch., AIM: The World’s Most Successful Growth Market, in 
LONDON STOCK EXCH., JOINING AIM: A PROFESSIONAL HANDBOOK 4-14 (2007), 
available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/DBA42382-DCD4-
4966-9733-F6ACB01FBA10/0/JoiningAIMAprofessionalhandbookFinal.pdf. 
 230. See AIM Rules for Companies, supra note 180, Rule 7, at 4.  The lock-in 
provision set forth in AIM’s Rules for Companies partially offset the lack of these 
requirements. See id.  Under this rule, if a business has not been active and earning 
revenue for at least two years, its related parties and employees are locked in as 
shareholders. Id.  This measure is clearly intended to protect investors from fraudulent 
schemes or the use of worthless cash shells. See id. 
 231. See London Stock Exch., AIM Rules for Nominated Advisers, sched. 2 (2007), 
available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/8104E31B-946D-
49F1-A82B-CC14499B435A/0/AIMNominatedAdviser.pdf [hereinafter AIM Rules for 
Nominated Advisers].  AIM’s Rules for Nomads contain a certification model, pursuant 
to which Nomads must attest, inter alia, that “the applicant and its securities are 
appropriate to be admitted to AIM, having made due and careful enquiry and 
considered all relevant matters set out in the AIM Rules for Companies and the AIM 
Rules for Nominated Advisers.” Id. 
 232. See id., sched. 3, at 16.  The test imposes certain responsibilities on Nomads 
regarding the admission of applicants to AIM. See id.  Although such duties are 
principles-based, AIM’s Rules suggest a number of actions whose execution is 
considered appropriate in assessing an applicant’s suitability. See id.  For example, 
Nomads are compelled to achieve a “sound understanding” of the applicant’s business. 
Id.  In order to do so, the Rules recommend measures such as undertaking visits to the 
applicant’s site of operations and using external experts to analyze the latter’s business. 
See id. 
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Nomads mandate a rigorous examination of the applicant’s affairs.233  
AIM requires Nomads to soundly understand an applicant’s business 
plans, management structure, and financial and legal status before 
certifying that a firm is qualified for listing.234
Consequently, the admission process entails considerable legal and 
financial due diligence, in addition to a complete review of the relevant 
entry documents.235  In performing their functions as AIM’s 
gatekeepers, Nomads ascertain whether a company’s admission will 
provide shareholders with real value and enhance the venue’s 
reputation.236  At this juncture, Nomads also determine whether a 
company has reached the appropriate stage of its growth cycle to seek an 
AIM listing.  In cases where listing costs outweigh its benefits and 
admittance to AIM is not in the best interests of a company, the Nomad 
is advised to refrain from providing certification.237  Nomads have 
significant incentives to ensure that only suitable companies gain access 
to the market.238  A thorough review during the entry process generally 
spans three to six months.239
Suitable AIM applicants must complete and submit an admission 
document containing all relevant information about the firm.240  The 
applicant must supply detailed information, including a description of 
the company’s business, financial information, risk factors, legal 
structure and material contracts, relevant legal proceedings, and any 
 233. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 142, at 97; Colin Aaronson, Role of the Nominated 
Adviser in an AIM Flotation, in LONDON STOCK EXCH., JOINING AIM: A PROFESSIONAL 
HANDBOOK 19-28 (2007), available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonl 
yres/DBA42382-DCD4-4966-9733-F6ACB01FBA10/0/JoiningAIMAprofessionalhand 
bookFinal.pdf.  It appears that a certain degree of consensus in the Nomad industry 
exists as to the standards for measuring companies undergoing the suitability test.  
Rousseau refers to some areas usually verified by the Nomads, which include 
management composition, corporate governance, business viability, market potential, 
and working capital. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 142, at 97.  Aaronson describes the way 
in which Nomads should inquire into each of these areas. See Aaronson, supra, at 19-
28. 
 234. See AIM Rules for Nominated Advisers, supra note 231, sched. 3, at 16. 
 235. See id.  AIM’s Rules determine that Nomads must oversee the due diligence 
process to ensure that it is conducted adequately. See id. 
 236. See Aaronson, supra note 233, at 19-20. 
 237. See id. at 20. 
 238. For instance, Nomads have reputational incentives to perform this task 
diligently. See infra Part III.B.4. 
 239. See Bauer & Boritz, supra note 142, at 7. 
 240. See AIM Rules for Companies, supra note 180, Rule 3, at 3. 
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other information “which it reasonably considers necessary to enable its 
investors to form a full understanding of the assets, liabilities, financial 
position, profits and losses, and prospects of the applicant and its 
securities for which admission is being sought.”241  If the applicant 
specializes in a particular field, such as mining or technology, the 
admission document should contain an expert’s report providing 
investors sufficient information to make sound investment decisions.242  
In the case of investment companies, managers must attest to at least 
three years of performance data experience.243  The admission document 
must also contain directors’ statements assuming responsibility for the 
veracity of all supplied information and certifying the adequacy of the 
firm’s working capital.244  Importantly, Nomads participate in the 
drafting process and verify proper completion of the admission 
documents.245  Nomads’ examination of the entry documents serves the 
purpose of a regulatory review, not unlike the one conducted by the 
U.K.’s Financial Services Authority (“FSA”) when admitting a company 
to the Official List. Applicants must make their admission document 
publicly available at least one month before admittance to AIM.246  
Additionally, the listing process requires the issuance of a pre-admission 
document at least ten business days prior to admission, in which basic 
company information is provided.247  The exchange forwards the 
information to its Regulatory Information Service, which then publishes 
an announcement on AIM’s website and adds the applicant to the AIM 
listing.248
If an applicant seeks to make a public share offering concurrently 
with admission to AIM, it must draft and circulate a prospectus instead 
of the aforementioned admission document.249  The prospectus must 
 241. See id., sched. 2(k), at 45; see also Aaronson, supra note 233, at 26 (detailing 
that applicants must also reveal information about key personnel, firm policy on 
corporate governance, share option and dividend policies, an indication of substantial 
shareholders, and a summary of tax issues). 
 242. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 142, at 109. 
 243. See Bauer & Boritz, supra note 142, at 9. 
 244. See AIM Rules for Companies, supra note 180, Rule 3, at 3. 
 245. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 142, at 104. 
 246. See AIM Rules for Companies, supra note 180, Rule 3, at 3. 
 247. See id., Rule 2, at 3. 
 248. See id. 
 249. See Bauer & Boritz, supra note 142, at 6.  The public nature of an offering is 
determined by examining the number of non-qualified investors to which the offer is 
addressed.  Qualified investors are defined as those authorized to execute investment 
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comply with the more comprehensive FSA Prospectus Rules, including 
the provisions introduced after the European Prospectus Directive.  
Unlike the admission document, the prospectus is subject to regulatory 
review by the FSA, which acts as the U.K.’s listing authority.250  
However, AIM share issuances—both concurrent with and subsequent 
to admission—commonly involve private placements, in which a 
restricted number of investors are invited to acquire shares in the 
applicant firm, thus eliminating the need to publish a prospectus.251  This 
comports with AIM’s reliance on a large, qualified investor base.  As a 
result, few AIM applications have necessitated the issuance of a 
prospectus.252
Private placements gives rise to numerous advantages for AIM 
firms and investors alike.  Issuer companies benefit from a faster, 
cheaper equity-raising process, as compared to a public offering.  
Investors in these placements have greater control over their investments 
and can more readily assess the risks associated with the issuing 
company.253  Family firms might also profit from private placements.  
Controlling insiders could negotiate terms with prospective investors, 
forfeiting some benefits of private control in exchange for increased 
capital.254
As the AIM market matures and shifts its focus to larger firms, it is 
likely that applicants and listed companies alike will gravitate away 
from private placements and toward public offerings, which involve the 
business and include financial institutions, mutual and pension funds, large 
corporations, and individuals registered with the FSA. See id. at 6.  If an applicant is 
expected to have more than 100 non-qualified investors, it must publish a prospectus 
instead of an admission document.  Other exceptions to the publication of a prospectus 
relate to the size of the issue (roughly less than $3 million) and the minimum 
consideration to be paid by any person for offered securities (roughly $65,000). See 
Initial Public Offerings on AIM for U.S. Corporations, supra note 221, at 8. 
 250. See Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 87 (U.K.) (establishing a 
compulsory review process, in which the FSA verifies that the submitted prospectus 
contains all required information); see, e.g., Fin. Servs. Auth. Handbook, Prospectus 
Rules, 2008, S.I. 2008/1, R. 5.3.1 to 5.3.4 (U.K.), available at 
http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/PR/5/3#D66 (last visited Feb. 12, 2008). 
 251. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 142, at 110. 
 252. See Bauer & Boritz, supra note 142, at 6. 
 253. See Friedman & Grose, supra note 103, at 27. 
 254. See BAKER TILLY ET AL., TAKING AIM (2007).  A recent survey conducted by 
Baker Tilly shows that a high percentage of family firms consider AIM to be a fairly 
attractive option for raising capital. Id.  However, no studies have been conducted on 
the specific relation between AIM private placements and family firms going public. 
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drafting of a prospectus.255  In fact, some U.S. law firms have already 
struck marketing deals with AIM, emphasizing the prospectus-based 
IPO process as the ideal gateway to the market.256  Figure 4 contains a 
portrayal of the admission process for firms undergoing private 
placements and public offerings. 
 
FIGURE 4 
AIM ADMISSION PROCESS 
 
Private Placements 
 
Source: AIM in a U.S. Context: Exploding Some Myths, supra note 
115, at 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 255. See Bauer & Boritz, supra note 142, at 4.  Recent figures show that the AIM 
market is indeed maturing and granting entry to ever larger firms. See id. 
 256. See HAYNES & BOONE, THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT MARKET (2006) (on 
file with author); see also infra Part III.C (providing more information about these 
alleged marketing deals). 
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Public Offerings 
 
 
Source: HAYNES & BOONE, supra note 256. 
 
The AIM listing process also features fast-track admission for so-
called “quoted applicants.”257  This streamlined process exempts AIM 
applicants already listed in certain overseas exchanges from submitting 
an admission document.258  Quoted applicants are deemed acceptable for 
an AIM listing due to their track record in one of several recognized 
listing venues, dubbed AIM Designated Markets.  These venues include 
the NYSE, NASDAQ, Euronext, the Deutsche Börse, and the UKLA 
Official List, among others.259  Under fast-track admission, quoted 
applicants must issue a pre-admission document, which is more detailed 
than the one required under the standard listing process.260  Under this 
 
 257. See AIM Rules for Companies, supra note 180, at 28.  Quoted applicants are 
defined as issuers that trade their securities in AIM Designated Markets for at least 
eighteen months prior to an AIM admittance. Id.; see LONDON STOCK EXCH., AIM 
DESIGNATED MARKETS, available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyr 
es/A1DF2948-5726-4075-B8C5-46E2EECF9353/0/AIMDesignatedMarkets1.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2008) (listing the AIM Designated Markets). 
 258. See LONDON STOCK EXCH., AIM DESIGNATED MARKETS, supra note 257. 
 259. Id. 
 260. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 142, at 105.  Rousseau points out that quoted 
applicants must also comply with certain technical requirements, such as conforming 
their financial statements to GAAP or, in the alternative, IAS. Id. 
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expedited process, applicants must still retain the services of a Nomad 
and pass the suitability test administered prior to AIM admittance.261
After the applicant submits the required admission documentation, 
the Nomad certification of suitability, and pays the AIM listing fee, 
admission is complete, and the exchange will issue a dealing notice 
granting entry to the market.262  AIM’s initial listing fee is fixed, unlike 
other exchanges such as NASDAQ, which calculates the fee based upon 
the aggregate number of shares being listed.263  AIM has set its initial 
listing fee around ₤4535 (roughly $7300), which is significantly lower 
than a NASDAQ listing ($100,000 - $150,000 for a listing in the Global 
Select segment and $50,000 - $70,000 for a listing in the Capital Market 
segment),264 but higher than the fee charged by the Entry Standard 
Segment of the Deutsche Börse (roughly $2000 for private placements 
and $1000 with a prospectus).265  Listing fee included, the total cost of 
an AIM listing appears to be lower than a NASDAQ listing.  Table 3 
shows a comparison of direct initial listing costs (expressed in U.S. 
dollars), based on the premise of a company seeking to launch a $50 
million IPO on both AIM and NASDAQ.266
 
 
 
 
 
 261. See generally Bauer & Boritz, supra note 142; ROUSSEAU, supra note 142.  
This process is expected to last anywhere from four to six weeks, a significant reduction 
from the three to six months for non-quoted applicants under the standard process. See 
Bauer & Boritz, supra note 142; ROUSSEAU, supra note 142. 
 262. See AIM Rules for Companies, supra note 180, Rules 5-6, at 4.  The dealing 
notice is made public through the exchange’s Regulatory Information Service. Id. 
 263. See NASDAQ, Inc., Listing Standards & Fees, supra note 123, at 5. 
 264. Id. 
 265. See Entry Standard: Tailormade Capital Market Access for Small-Caps and 
Mid-Caps (Deutsche Börse Group, Frankfurt/Main, F.R.G.), Nov. 2007, available at 
http://deutscheboerse.com/dbag/dispatch/en/binary/gdb_content_pool/imported_files/pu
blic_files/10_downloads/33_going_being_public/50_others/entry_standard_broschuere
_06.9.pdf. 
 266. See IS AIM THE NEW NASDAQ, supra note 170, at 4; Bauer & Boritz, supra 
note 142, at 7.  While the cost difference in this chart is significant, other estimates 
show an AIM IPO posting around $922,000 in costs, as opposed to $2.4 million in 
NASDAQ. See IS AIM THE NEW NASDAQ, supra note 170, at 4; Bauer & Boritz, 
supra note 142, at 7. 
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TABLE 3 
AIM VS NASDAQ—DIRECT INITIAL LISTING COSTS 
 
DIRECT INITIAL LISTING COSTS 
AIM IPO NASDAQ IPO 
Item Cost Item Cost 
Nomad / Broker 
Fee 
$2,000,000 Underwriting Fee $3,500,000 
Corporate Finance 
Fee 
   $500,000 Legal Fees    $500,000 
Company Counsel    $262,000 Miscellaneous Fees     $145,000 
Nomad Counsel    $300,000 Printing Fees      $75,000 
Accounting Fees    $312,000 Accounting Fees       $65,000 
AIM Fee        $7,300 NASDAQ Listing Fee     $100,000 
Registration Fee      $45,000 SEC and NASD 
Registration Fees 
    $107,000 
Total $3,426,300 Total  $4,472,000 
 
Source: ThinkEquity Partners, supra note 131. 
 
A significant cost difference between AIM and NASDAQ also 
appears to exist regarding ongoing compliance for listed companies.  As 
aforementioned, the exchange-regulated nature of AIM allows it to issue 
a set of rules, imposing low disclosure and governance hurdles upon its 
listed firms.267  The AIM rulebook contains a meager forty-five rules, of 
which roughly twenty-eight concern a company’s ongoing obligations 
after listing.268  Most of these rules seek to ensure timely and adequate 
disclosure of all relevant information to the marketplace.  Other rules 
oblige companies to retain a Nomad at all times and pay listing fees.269  
Table 4 compares direct ongoing costs for AIM and NASDAQ firms 
based on the premise of an already completed $50 million IPO. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 267. See AIM Rules for Companies, supra note 180, Rules 10-38, at 5-11. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
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TABLE 4 
AIM VS NASDAQ—DIRECT ONGOING LISTING COSTS 
 
DIRECT ONGOING LISTING COSTS 
AIM  NASDAQ  
Item Cost Item Cost 
Nomad Fee   $90,000 SOX Compliance $3,500,000 
AIM Annual Fee     $7,300 
Accountants   $50,000 
NASDAQ Annual 
Fee 
     $17,500 
Total $147,300 Total $3,517,500 
 
Source: ThinkEquity Partners, supra note 131. 
 
2.  Disclosure Requirements Following Admission 
AIM’s regulatory model presupposes proper communication and 
continuous disclosure of information flowing from listed companies to 
the marketplace.270  Since AIM’s investor base is predominantly 
institutional and private placements are commonplace, listed companies 
feature a small number of investors with whom they maintain tight 
links.271  Even though AIM’s ongoing rules for listed companies may 
appear lax prima facie, disclosure levels are close to optimal for a 
sophisticated investor base that demands adequate information.  Nomads 
play an important role in maintaining AIM’s market integrity, as they 
liaison between companies and investors and essentially advise AIM 
companies as to the timing, form, and content of any disclosures that 
must be made to the market.272  With Nomad assistance, AIM firms can 
reduce compliance costs by setting apart relevant information—which 
should be disclosed—from immaterial information.273  Thus, Nomads 
fulfill their general mandate that disclosed information is not misleading 
 
 270. See London Stock Exch., AIM: The World’s Most Successful Growth Market, 
supra note 229, at 13. 
 271. IS AIM THE NEW NASDAQ, supra note 170, at 5 (“AIM is predominantly an 
institutional market, which means its investor relationships can be structured more 
efficiently than those of a market where shares are mainly traded retail.”). 
 272. See Aaronson, supra note 233, at 34. 
 273. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 142, at 105 (“Since the Nomad is acting as 
regulator, this framework can reduce the risk of non-disclosure of important 
information by issuers for good reasons.”). 
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or deceptive and that a company does not omit “anything likely to affect 
the import of such information.”274
A company listed in AIM is obliged to disclose price sensitive, non-
public information.275  AIM’s definition of price sensitive information—
any new developments which, if made public, would be likely to lead to 
a substantial movement in the price of a company’s AIM securities276—
is coupled with a list of defining criteria regarding the area in which 
such developments may occur: (1) financial condition, (2) sphere of 
activity, (3) business performance, and (4) expectations as to business 
performance.277  AIM adopted this definition pursuant to the 
implementation of the European Directive on Insider Dealing and 
Market Manipulation (dubbed the “Market Abuse Directive”), 
applicable in part to AIM, despite its condition as an exchange regulated 
venue.278  This extensive application also affects AIM’s insider trading 
regime.279  AIM companies must work closely with their Nomads, 
charged with ensuring market awareness “of all information that needs 
to be in the public domain,” to determine which information is price 
sensitive and merits disclosure.280
 274. See AIM Rules for Companies, supra note 180, Rule 10, at 5. 
 275. See id., Rule 11, at 5. 
 276. See id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. See Transposition Note for Directive (EC) 2003/6, The Market Abuse 
Directive, available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/7/B/MAD_tn240205.pdf.  
The issuance of several instruments, including the Financial Services and Markets Act 
Regulations 2005, completed the adoption of the Market Abuse Directive in the U.K.  
Upon implementation, the scope of the Market Abuse Directive—which applied only to 
regulated markets—was extended to cover AIM. Id. 
 279. See Market Abuse, The EU Directive on Insider Dealing and Market 
Manipulation, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING (Goliath/Thomson-Gale Info. Serv.), Feb. 3, 
2005.  Indeed, the main market abuse offences contemplated under the Directive are 
deemed applicable to AIM-listed companies, but other provisions, such as the issuance 
of insider lists, are not. See id.  AIM’s rules specify: 
[S]ecurities of an AIM company may not be traded by its directors or applicable 
employees during a trading close period.  In this context, applicable employees are 
those employees likely to be in possession of unpublished price-sensitive information 
in relation to the company because of their employment with the company . . . . 
Nomads will insist that an AIM company adopt an insider-trading policy to comply 
with the above. 
ROBERT BRANT ET AL., LEXPERT 500, AIM: GATEWAY TO EUROPEAN MARKETS 6-7 
(2005), available at http://www.lexpert.ca/500/lb.php?id=91. 
 280. See Aaronson, supra note 233, at 29. 
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AIM rules also categorize four types of corporate transactions that 
require disclosure: (1) substantial transactions, (2) related party 
transactions, (3) reverse takeovers, and (4) disposals resulting in a 
fundamental change of business.281  The exchange designed specific 
“class tests” for each transaction type,282 addressing factors such as 
gross assets, profits, or turnover ratios to determine transaction size and 
relevancy.  For instance, the Gross Assets Test computes the gross assets 
of the acquisition or disposition contemplated by the relevant transaction 
over those of the AIM company, while the Turnover Test similarly 
computes the ratio of the turnover attributable to the contemplated 
transaction to that of the AIM company overall.283  Substantial 
transactions, then, are defined as those that exceed a threshold of 10% in 
any of the class tests.  Related party transactions284 and reverse 
takeovers285 set forth additional criteria.  AIM firms engaging in any of 
these transactions must also provide specific information, supplementing 
the general duty to disclose.286  The aggregation of transactions executed 
over a period of twelve months prior to the latest operation completes 
this set of AIM rules.287
Though less stringent than most stock exchange venues, AIM 
requires companies to periodically disclose financial information.288  For 
example, AIM companies must prepare a semi-annual report, containing 
a balance sheet, income and cash flow statements, and comparative 
figures for the corresponding period in the previous year.289  Companies 
must also prepare, publish, and send to shareholders audited annual 
accounts within six months of the conclusion of the fiscal year.290  
Unlike the requirements set forth under SOX, executive officers of AIM 
 281. See AIM Rules for Companies, supra note 180, Rules 12-15, at 5-6. 
 282. See id., sched. 3, at 20-21. 
 283. See id. 
 284. See id., Rule 13, at 5-6. 
 285. See id., Rules 10-11, at 5.  If a takeover transaction does not meet class test 
thresholds, a company must account for fundamental changes in business or board and 
voting control, or in the case of investing companies, any substantial departures from 
initial investing strategies. See id. 
 286. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 142, at 118 (identifying additional information 
needed, such as the identities of related parties). 
 287. See AIM Rules for Companies, supra note 180, Rule 16, at 7. 
 288. See id., Rule 11, at 5. 
 289. See id., Rule 18, at 7-8. 
 290. See id., Rule 19, at 8. 
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companies are not called upon to certify financial reports.291  Critics 
proclaiming AIM’s regulatory laxity often reference the absence of 
quarterly reports or executive certification of financial reports.292  To the 
extent that institutional investors acquiring AIM securities exert close 
scrutiny, given their long-term expectations and close relationship with 
issuers, and the Nomad’s involvement counteracting AIM leniency, this 
negative assessment is unjustified.293  AIM rounds out its disclosure 
requirements with such miscellaneous information as: deals undertaken 
by directors, relevant changes to significant shareholdings,294 changes in 
board composition, material changes between actual performance and 
profit forecasts, resignations, dismissals and appointments of Nomads, 
and admission to trading in any other exchange.295
The exchange’s Regulatory Information Service channels the 
required disclosure information—including any data specifically 
requested by the exchange.296  Recent amendments to the AIM rules 
obligate every company to establish and maintain a website containing 
financial and corporate information297 before August 26, 2007.298  
Multiple private parties already offer website services specifically 
designed for AIM companies.299
 291. See supra Part II. 
 292. See, e.g., Blackwell & Gapper, supra note 149, at 8. 
 293. Nomads must ensure that AIM companies comply with ongoing disclosure 
requirements and employ due care in ensuring that disclosed information is accurate. 
 294. See London Stock Exch., AIM Notice No. 25: Changes to the Disclosure of 
Significant Shareholders (Nov. 11, 2006), available at http://www.londonstockexchang 
e.com/NR/rdonlyres/37156CEB-E10C-4551-A2B0-E6BE3AB38047/0/AIMNotice25.p 
df.  This requirement can be seen as a direct consequence of the implementation of the 
Transparency Directive in the UK.  Although most of the Transparency Directive did 
not affect AIM, disclosure of relevant shareholding was retained. Id.; see also London 
Stock Exch., AIM Notice No. 26: Update on AIM Notice 25 (Disclosure of Significant 
Shareholders) and Discussion of Other Legislative Changes (Including Electronic 
Communications) (Jan. 12, 2007), available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/N 
R/rdonlyres/A1DF2CCC-8530-4328-9A8B-3EF44DD45566/0/AIMNotice25_FINAL_ 
pdf. 
 295. See AIM Rules for Companies, supra note 180, Rule 17, at 7. 
 296. Id., Rules 22-23, at 9.  The exchange is entitled to request any kind of 
information from AIM listed companies and to mandate the publication of such data. 
See id. 
 297. See id., Rule 26, at 9. 
 298. See id. 
 299. See, e.g., AIM Compliance, http://www.aimcompliance.com/ (last visited Feb. 
17, 2008). 
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3.  Corporate Governance for AIM Firms 
While AIM regulates, to some extent, disclosure requirements, the 
exchange leaves unaddressed corporate governance.  AIM firms are not 
legally bound to comply with the provisions of the U.K.’s Combined 
Code on Corporate Governance,300 nor does the exchange require that its 
companies create audit committees or appoint independent directors.301  
Nevertheless, market pressures offset the lack of prescriptive regulation 
and drive firms to voluntarily adopt corporate governance provisions. 
AIM’s investor base is mainly composed of sophisticated 
institutions that delve profoundly into the business of a firm before 
investing in its shares.302  Institutional investors would not take interest 
in a company lacking the necessary mechanisms to ensure adequate 
corporate governance.303  To allure prospective investors, AIM 
companies often integrate various corporate governance mechanisms 
and disclose these policies in their admission documents and 
websites.304  Nomads also commonly persuade their clients to adopt high 
corporate governance standards.305
 
 300. See David Robbins, Corporate Governance and AIM, in AIM: A CLOSER LOOK 
(Media Planet/London Stock Exch., London, Eng.), Apr. 20, 2007, at 12, available at 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/FAD7D047-6B52-4A00-9AE6-
9F0526F881DC/0/AIMAcloserlook.pdf.  The Combined Code incorporates 
recommendations from a number of authorities, including the Cadbury report, the 
Greenbury report, the Smith report, the Turnbull report, and the Higgs report. See 
FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, THE COMBINED CODE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
(2003), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/lr_comcode2003.pdf. 
 301. See AIM Rules for Companies, supra note 180, Rules 14-15, at 6.  However, 
some transactions require shareholder approval, such as in a “reverse takeover” or a 
disposal of corporate assets exceeding 75% percent in any of the class tests. Id. 
 302. See supra notes 270-74. 
 303. Monitoring and Taking Action on Financial Performance, Corporate 
Governance and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 204.  In demanding the 
introduction of corporate governance provisions for AIM firms, a major institutional 
investor stressed that “the main principles of good corporate governance embodied in 
the (Combined Code) are applicable to listed companies of all sizes and stages of 
development.” Id. 
 304. See, e.g., Supporta, Investor Relations, http://www.supportaplc.com/investor-
relations/corporate-governance/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2008); Zenergy Power, Investor 
Relations, http://www.zenergypower.com/investors/corporate_governance (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2008). 
 305. See Aaronson, supra note 233, at 35. 
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Since no compulsory rules exist, AIM companies have a certain 
degree of flexibility regarding the mechanics of their internal 
governance structures.  Nevertheless, investors’ and Nomads’ vision of 
best practice largely constrains firm autonomy.  Any sub-optimal 
corporate governance regime will undoubtedly negatively impact a 
firm’s ability to raise equity or maintain continuity as an AIM-listed 
company.306  AIM firms are thus expected to comply with the Combined 
Code or, if some provisions are considered detrimental or overly costly, 
justify non-compliance.  However, the rules promulgated by the 
Combined Code are generally intended to govern the affairs of larger 
corporations (i.e., those listed in the U.K.’s Official List) and might not 
be fit for the smaller companies listed on AIM.  Combined Code 
adherence may lead to an unnecessary increase in compliance costs for 
firms that can ill afford to waste resources abiding by stiff governance 
processes. 
The Corporate Governance Guidelines for AIM Companies, 
published by the Quoted Company Alliance (“QCA”), exemplify recent 
efforts to address the drawbacks of Combined Code application to AIM 
firms.307  The QCA guidelines are tailored to small firms and represent 
the consensus view on best practices by the AIM advisory and investor 
community.308  Overall, the guidelines do not stray far from the 
principles set out in the Combined Code, but they do adjust the specific 
governance mechanisms to the needs of small-caps.  For instance, the 
guidelines underscore the importance of having two independent 
directors, and further suggest that different individuals should act as 
Chairman of the Board and CEO.309  The guidelines also advocate 
 306. See infra Part III.B.4.  It must be stressed that Nomads, charged with assessing 
the continuous suitability of firms listed in AIM, could single out any company which 
does not abide by high standards of governance and disclosure.  Such a company would 
surely be excluded or suspended from AIM. 
 307. See The Quoted Companies Alliance, Publications, http://www.quotedcompan 
iesalliance.co.uk/guidance_booklets.asp (last visited Feb. 17, 2008) (offering guidance 
booklets, including the Corporate Governance Guidelines for AIM Companies).  This 
not-for-profit organization claims to protect the interests of the smaller quoted company 
sector. Id. 
 308. See Joining AIM: A Field Guide for Potential Applicants to the AIM Market of 
the London Stock Exchange, NEWS & INSIGHTS (DLA Piper UK LLP, London, U.K.), 
Nov. 29, 2007, at 8, http://www.dlapiper.com/global/publications/detail.aspx?pub=2867 
 309. See What Additional Responsibilities and Obligations Arise for Directors of 
AIM Companies?, BRIEFING NOTES (Manches, LLP, London, U.K.), Aug. 2006, 
http://www.manches.com/downloads/briefings/AIM_Director_Responsibilities.pdf 
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proportionally-sized remuneration, auditing, and nomination committees 
composed of non-executive directors.310  Moreover, the QCA guidelines 
recommend that the board of directors ensure satisfactory shareholder 
dialogue and conduct an annual review of the firm’s internal governance 
controls.311
Following QCA’s initiative, the U.K.’s National Association of 
Pension Funds (“NAPF”) published its own set of guidelines in March 
2007.  The NAPF’s Policy and Voting Guidelines for AIM Companies is 
consistent with QCA’s previous efforts to create a customized 
governance code, and even complement the latter’s guidelines.312  
However, some overlapping provisions exist—particularly in regard to 
director independence and board committees—which could create 
confusion for companies following both sets of principles.313  Since the 
NAPF guidelines do not cover every aspect of internal governance, 
some recommend initial application of the Combined Code “in a way in 
which is appropriate to [an AIM firm’s] circumstances and its size.”314  
The guidelines also focus on increased disclosure standards, 
remuneration arrangements, pre-emption, and senior independent 
directors.315
AIM’s unique system of corporate governance, which relies on 
market pressures and incentive structures, has hitherto produced positive 
results.316  To date, a majority of AIM companies comply with the 
[hereinafter Manches, LLP]. 
 310. See The Practical Law Company – Corporate, Remuneration committee terms 
of reference: AIM, http://corporate.practicallaw.com/7-202-2501 (last visited Jan. 14, 
2008) (stating that remuneration committees should contain “at least two members but 
companies with larger boards may want to increase this”); Public Companies Update 
(Charles Russell LLP, London, U.K.), Sept. 2005, at 5, http://www.cr-law.co.uk/resourc 
es/pdf/Public_Companies_Update_0905.pdf. 
 311. See Manches, LLP, supra note 309. 
 312. See Corporate Governance Policy: Policy and Voting Guidelines for AIM 
Companies (NAPF, London, U.K.), Mar. 2007, at 3, http://www.napf.co.uk/documentar 
chive.asp (follow “Policy” hyperlink; then follow “Corporate Governance” hyperlink).  
In order to issue its own principles, NAPF consulted the QCA to assist consistency 
between both sets of guidelines. Id. 
 313. See id. 
 314. NAPF Corporate Governance Policy for AIM-Listed Companies, CORPORATE 
BRIEFING (Travers Smith, London, U.K.), May 2007, http://www.traverssmith.com/?pid 
=24&level=2. 
 315. See id. 
 316. See BAKER TILLY ET AL., supra note 254, at 15.  According to a 2006 survey, 
AIM investors see improvement in the level of corporate governance within the market. 
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provisions of the Combined Code or QCA’s Guidelines.317  Most of 
these companies implement governance regimes customized to their 
particular characteristics.318  The tailoring procedure decreases 
compliance costs while simultaneously signals to the market 
implementation of best practice corporate governance standards.  Again, 
the Nomad’s advisory role is central during this fine-tuning process.319  
A Nomad’s knowledge of market trends and its relationship with 
institutional investors helps to prescribe the optimal level of corporate 
governance for AIM firms.320
4.  The Nominated Adviser 
Without doubt, the comprehensive role of the Nominated Adviser is 
the strongest pillar of AIM’s regulatory model.  Assigned the two-fold 
task of assessing a firm’s AIM suitability and advising disclosure and 
corporate governance compliance, Nomads preserve the integrity and 
reputation of the market.321  As a liaison between listed companies and 
the exchange’s authorities,322 Nomads simultaneously play the part of 
gatekeeper, adviser, and ultimately, regulator, of AIM.  Not surprisingly, 
applicants for Nomad status must clear a rigorous screening process.  
The exchange sets a high financial and legal standard for Nomad 
admission.323  In addition to the prescriptive criteria, the exchange also 
 
See id.  However, 14% of AIM investors have clear doubts about whether AIM’s 
system of corporate governance is in accordance with normal market standards. Id. 
 317. See David Robbins, Corporate Governance and AIM, AIM: A CLOSER LOOK 
(Baker Tilly, London, U.K.), Apr. 2007, http://www.bakertilly.co.uk/default.aspx?page 
=2670; Emilio Cattaneo, Equity Capital Markets Alternative Routes to Raising Capital 
(CFS Partners, London, U.K.), Feb. 2007, http://www.cavedatos.org.ve/download/cdt_4 
42.pdf; A Review of Corporate Governance Adoption with Aim Companies in the South 
West (Grant Thornton, London, U.K.), Dec. 2005, http://www.grant-thornton.co.uk/port 
als/grantthornton/documents/3-aim-corporate-governance-.pdf. 
 318. See WHY U.S. (AND NON-EUROPEAN) COMPANIES NEED AIM, supra note 204, 
at 8. 
 319. Id.  Nomads allow corporate governance to be adjusted “to ensure the most 
critical risks were contained, while ensuring that management time was not wasted on 
over-rigid control of the wrong parts of a business.” Id. 
 320. See Aaronson, supra note 233, at 35. 
 321. See id. at 22. 
 322. See AIM Rules for Nominated Advisers, supra note 231, Rule 19, at 9. 
 323. Id., Rule 2, at 3.  Nomad applicants must (i) have practiced corporate finance 
for a period of at least two years, (ii) have acted in at least three relevant transactions 
(as defined by AIM rules), and (iii) employ at least four executives that meet AIM 
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considers the applicant’s reputation and its commercial and regulatory 
performance.324
AIM created the Nomad figure to advise small firms that lacked the 
experience to properly function as listed companies.325  In addition to 
this consulting role, the exchange decided to outsource the responsibility 
for firm compliance of market rules to these entities.326  By devolving 
part of its regulatory authority to Nomads, AIM succeeded in ensuring 
that their advice—albeit non-compulsory—would be closely followed 
by public companies.327  The exchange also afforded these entities full 
discretionary powers to determine whether a company was unsuitable to 
maintain its AIM listing.  Nomads can easily single out and remove 
rogue firms that refuse to abide by proper standards of governance and 
disclosure.328  As the best positioned agent to detect substandard 
behavior, Nomads are justifiably charged with preserving the integrity 
and reputation of AIM by overseeing the firms that they advise.329
The adequacy of Nomads as AIM’s regulators and gatekeepers 
could be challenged on the grounds that these entities have a vested 
interest in the firms they counsel.330  A unique incentive structure, 
standards for adequacy. Id. 
 324. See id., Rule 3, at 3-4. 
 325. See Aaronson, supra note 233, at 18. 
 326. See id. 
 327. See id. at 8.  Each Nomad must charge at least two qualified members of its 
staff to oversee each company. See id. 
 328. See AIM Rules for Companies, supra note 180, Rule 40, at 12.  In practice, 
however, Nomads retain no real power to impose sanctions upon listed firms.  If any 
company does not abide by acceptable corporate governance principles without 
justification, the Nomad notifies the AIM Regulation Department, which may in turn 
remove the firm’s listed status or impose any other applicable sanction.  AIM may 
adduce any number of reasons, including the need to protect the market’s reputation or 
to safeguard investors. See id. (discussing AIM’s need to protect the market’s 
reputation); Aaronson, supra note 233, at 8 (discussing AIM’s need to safeguard 
investors). 
 329. See Aaronson, supra note 233, at 19-20.  Nomads preserve AIM’s reputation 
by ensuring not only that a company is suitable for admittance, but also that its 
subsequent behavior does not have a negative impact on the market. See id. 
 330. See Bauer & Boritz, supra note 142, at 8.  Some are wary about the Nomads’ 
relationship with the firms they advise.  The LSE is supposed to have a team of analysts 
constantly monitoring these advisers.  Bauer and Boritz argue that one could consider 
that this vested interest causes “sub-optimal information quality and investors to be 
misled.”  The authors then give several reasons for the unlikelihood of this scenario. See 
id. 
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however, steers Nomads’ performance.  Nomads are liable for improper 
reporting by their supervised companies331 and subject to investor 
lawsuits if investors are misled.332  A Nomad’s considerable reputational 
capital complements this set of negative incentives.  Like traditional 
gatekeepers, Nomads build their reputational capital by servicing clients 
over prolonged periods of time, and ultimately vouch for the suitability 
of AIM companies and the accuracy of their market disclosures.333  
Nomads bear a disproportionate loss from permitting or negligently 
overlooking any transgressions on behalf of their supervised companies.  
Currently active Nomads, including highly reputed firms like Morgan 
Stanley, Citigroup, and PriceWaterhouseCoopers, would suffer 
considerably for sub-optimal performance. 
Commentators still criticize that some Nomads are “as small and 
speculative as the companies they float.”334  Consequently, the exchange 
must still constantly supervise to ensure its “self-regulation system” 
functions properly.  Accordingly, AIM continuously reviews Nomad 
activities to verify due diligence.335  AIM rules also contain a number of 
measures to prevent conflicts of interest between a Nomad and listed 
companies, as well as to guarantee the former’s independence.336  
Advisers that fail to abide by market standards and practices may be 
subject to disciplinary proceedings and sanctions, including removal of 
Qualified Executive status, fines, censure motions, and expulsion from 
AIM.337  Although few entities have been levied the most severe 
 331. See ROBERT BRANT ET AL., supra note 279.  For instance, misstatements or 
omissions in an admission document can lead to civil or criminal liability for both the 
AIM applicant and its Nomad under the Financial Services and Markets Act. See id. 
 332. See Bauer & Boritz, supra note 142, at 9 (“The Nomad bears the risk of 
improper reporting and lawsuits for failing to uphold a proper duty of care to all 
investors.  Investors have legal recourse to pursue damages from the Nomads, the 
regulator of the shares, if they have been misled into making a poor investment.”). 
 333. See Coffee, Gatekeeper, supra note 48, at 11 (explaining the reputational 
incentives of gatekeepers). 
 334. See Business: AIM Changes, BRIEFINGS (Mischon de Reya, London, U.K.), 
Dec. 2006, http://www.mishcon.com/news/briefings/docs/briefing_176.aspx. 
 335. See AIM Rules for Nominated Advisors, supra note 231, pt. 3, at 11-12.
 336. See id., Rule 21, at 9.  According to Rule 21, these entities must be able to 
show sufficient independence from their clients “such that there is no reasonable basis 
for impugning the nominated adviser’s independence.” Id. 
 337. See id., Rules 27, 29, at 11. 
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as Alternext, Mercato Expandi, Entry Segment and First North, while 
 
penalties, the exchange has demonstrated willingness to sanction 
misbehaving Nomads when appropriate.338
C.  AIM—Going Forward 
Thus far, AIM has adapted to the shifting conditions of modern 
economic systems, allowing it to become a dominant player in the 
market for small firms with a high growth potential, as the performance 
statistics in Figure 5 corroborate. 
 
FIGURE 5 
AIM ADMISSIONS, MONEY RAISED AND MARKET VALUE (1995-2006) 
 
Source: BAKER TILLY ET AL., supra note 254. 
 
Still, as it faces increasing competition from both sides of the 
Atlantic, AIM will have to be more responsive to preserve its privileged 
position.  Within the European Union, fledging alternative markets such 
 338. See Recent Disciplinary Action on AIM, London Stock Exchange, 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/en-gb/about/cooverview/corpad/recentdisciplina 
ryactiononaim12.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2008). 
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still at an embryonic stage and not a current threat,339 could pose a 
challenge to AIM in the future.  AIM must also compete with the lower-
tier segments of well-established U.S. exchanges, such as NASDAQ’s 
Capital Market Segment and NYSE Arca, which offer special conditions 
for small-caps and benefit from such venues’ higher liquidity.340  AIM 
might also face competition within the U.K., specifically from the PLUS 
and OFEX trading platforms.341  Table 5 compares AIM’s admission 
requirements with those established by some of these other exchanges. 
In order to compete successfully with these venues, AIM must 
s on several areas.  For instance, AIM must constantly adjust its 
rules to fit investor needs and counter negative market trends.  Recent 
polls show that most AIM market participants consider its system of 
self-regulation to be effective.342  Most firms even point out that listing 
on AIM adds to their credibility as publicly-held companies.  Table 6 
provides details of a survey of 150 AIM-listed firms ascribing 
advantages of an AIM listing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 339. See BAKER TILLY ET AL., supra note 254, at 3. 
 340. See Alistair MacDonald, Rivals are Chasing AIM, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2007, 
at C5 (reporting that a third American competitor may soon enter the race).  The 
American Stock Exchange has requested SEC permission to set up a low-tier market 
named The American Platform.  This segment is designed for companies with a market 
capitalization of less than $50 million. Id. 
 341. The OFEX market operates at the lowest level of market capitalization and is 
not considered to be a direct competitor of AIM. See Incademy Investor Education, 
http://www.incademy.com/courses/How-the-stock-market-works/Why-do-companies-
list-on-the-Stock-Exchange/5/1014/10002 (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).  However, it is 
undeniable that certain overlap exists between AIM and OFEX, which could lead to 
future competition. See, e.g., London & Pacific Healthcare, Inc. Announces Initial 
Acquisition; Established Corporate Finance Firm to Create Additional Value and 
Expand Global Reach, MARKET WIRE, Mar. 8, 2007 (providing an example of a 
company, PSG Solutions Plc, which moved from OFEX to AIM). 
 342. See BAKER TILLY ET AL., supra note 254, at 15.  The survey, conducted among 
AIM companies and investors, shows that most described AIM’s model as “very” or 
“fairly” effective.  Although some investors would like to raise AIM’s regulatory 
stringency, they are also of the opinion that this would reduce the number of companies 
listing in the market.  This, again, may be seen as a response to the slowdown in overall 
performance during 2006. Cf. id. 
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TABLE 5 
ADMISSION REQUIREME MALL-CAP EXCHANGES NTS FOR S
COMPARATIVE ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 
 European Alternative Markets 
 
U.S. Markets 
 AIM Alternext Entry 
Segment 
Mercato 
Expandi 
NASDAQ NASDAQ 
CM 
Minimum 
 
No minimum At least US$ No 
mum 
t 
At least 400 share-
 
 
At least 300 
public float requirement 3.2 million 
(unless 
private 
placement) 
mini
requiremen
10% of 
equity 
holders; 
minimum 
market 
value 
between
US $8-20
million 
shareholders 
Initial equity No minimum No minimum No 
mum 
t 
No 
mum 
t 
US $0-30 
 
US $5 
required requirement requirement mini
requiremen
mini
requiremen
million 
(depending
on listing 
route)  
million 
Market No minimum No minimum No 
mum 
t 
At least US At least US At least US 
capitalization requirement requirement mini
requiremen
$1.3 
million 
$75 million $50 million 
Trading No minimum At least 2 At least 1 At least 2 0-2 years 
 
1 year 
history requirement years year years (depending
on listing 
route) 
Profitability No minimum Profitable is 
 
No 
mum 
t 
Last net 
nd 
No 
mum 
t 
No 
mum 
t 
requirement strongly 
recommended
mini
requiremen
earning a
turnover 
thresholds 
mini
requiremen
mini
requiremen
Accounting UK 
P/IFRS/US 
National 
g 
 
National 
RS 
 US GAAP US GAAP 
standards GAA
GAAP 
accountin
standards of
Member 
State/IFRS 
GAAP/IF
Source: Grant Thornton New Markets Guide 2006343
 
 343. GRANT NORTON, NEW MARKETS GUIDE (2006). 
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ADVANTAGE IM LISTING 
TABLE 6 
S OF AN A
A SURVEY OF 150 AIM FIRMS 
Advantage % of firms claiming a benefit 
Added to the company’s credibility 85% 
Provided long-term growth potential 82% 
Provided access to institutions 81% 
Provided the company London profile  79% 
Provided access to informed shareholders 71% 
Facilitated acquisitions 57% 
Provided company control over its future 54% 
Provided access to venture capital fund 44% 
 
Source: BOARD ET AL., supra note 75. 
 majority of AIM firms, however, posit that standards and 
regu
y in the process of increasing the number of 
inter
 
A
lation should tighten as the market matures in order to improve 
investor confidence.344  Going forward, AIM must also continue its 
unremitting oversight of Nomads and listed firms, improve its liquidity 
constraints, and increase its international issuer base.  Improvements in 
these areas are fundamental if AIM expects to mature into a deeper 
market, where larger companies can raise equity and benefit from 
enhanced liquidity. 
AIM is alread
national companies admitted to trading.  An aggressive marketing 
campaign conducted simultaneously in different continents has not only 
been highly rewarding, but underscores AIM’s impressive results over 
the past few years.  AIM marketing also benefits from alliances struck 
 
 344. See id. 
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with law firms and investment companies.345  Figure 6 shows the 
composition of AIM’s international company base. 
 
FIGURE 6 
INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES IN AIM 
 
 
 
Source: London Stock Exchange346
 
Two main areas of focus appear to be the U.S., where listing costs 
are deemed too high for small companies, and Asia, where firms are 
allured by the promise of cost-efficient access to capital and London’s 
prestige.  In the U.S., fast-growing companies based in Silicon Valley 
are starting to spurn domestic markets for an AIM listing.347  Table 7 
details some of the reasons voiced by U.S. firms listed on AIM. 
 
 345. See Press Release, Haynes & Boone LLP, Taking AIM on the London Stock 
Exchange (Mar. 16, 2005), http://haynesboone.com/about/pressDetail.asp?pressid=362.  
U.S. law firm Haynes & Boone appears to have struck such a deal and is currently 
marketing AIM as a viable alternative to U.S. capital markets.  The firm’s web page 
contains extensive positive information about AIM, and furthermore states that “Haynes 
and Boone representatives are available to those journalists interested in exploring the 
AIM and its potential.” See id. 
 346. London Stock Exch., Institutional Advisors on AIM, http://www.londonstockex 
change.com/en-gb/products/companyservices/ourmarkets/aim_new/Trade+and+Investin 
g/institutionalinvestorsonaim.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2008). 
 347. See Nicholas A. Vardy, London’s Alternative Investment Market: The New 
NASDAQ?, The Global Guru, http://www.theglobalguru.com/article.php?id=63&offer 
=GURU001 (last visited Jan 15, 2008). 
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TABLE 7 
MOTIVATIONS OF AIM-LISTED U.S. FIRMS 
 
 
MAIN REASONS OF U.S. COMPANIES FOR LISTING IN AIM  
Company Reason for listing 
Cyberscan Access to development capital 
Legacy Distribution Avoid costly US regulation 
Prometheus Achieve greater liquidity 
Elcom International Access capital unavailable in the US 
Intermap Technologies Gain an international shareholder base 
Gatekeeper Systems Facilitate expansion into Europe 
OCZ Remove inefficient financing 
Numerous Provide exit to venture capital investors 
 
Source: AIM in a U.S. Context: Exploding Some Myths, supra note 
115, at 3. 
 
Although AIM does offer these firms multiple advantages, certain 
restrictions still apply to U.S. companies.  For instance, in accordance 
with Rule 903 of Regulation S, these firms may only escape U.S. 
regulation if they abstain from direct selling efforts in U.S. territory.348  
Such regulation also becomes applicable to AIM-listed firms if their 
investor base exceeds 300 U.S. shareholders or 500 shareholders 
 
 348. See Initial Public Offerings on AIM for U.S. Corporations, supra note 219, at 7 
(detailing the so-called “Issuer Safe Harbor” provision). 
[A]n offer or sale of securities by the issuer, a distributor, any of their respective 
affiliates, or any person acting on behalf of any of the foregoing, shall be deemed to 
occur outside the United States within the meaning of Rule 901 if: (i) The offer or sale 
is made in an offshore transaction; (ii) No directed selling efforts are made in the United 
States by the issuer, a distributor, any of their respective affiliates, or any person acting 
on behalf of any of the foregoing; and (iii) The conditions of paragraph (b) of this 
section, as applicable, are satisfied. 
Id. 
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altogether.349  In Asia, Chinese companies have shown great interest in 
joining AIM.  Of the twenty-five Chinese firms reportedly listed on 
AIM, a majority spurned local and U.S. exchanges, though on different 
grounds.350  Other Asian companies have also successfully listed on 
AIM.351
The increasing number of international companies raises some 
concern as to the possibility of offshore vehicles listing on AIM for no 
good business purpose.352  Despite the multiple safeguards laid down by 
the exchange to prevent abuses (such as Nomad oversight, lock-ins, and 
compulsory use of raised funds), scandals and anomalies already 
comprise parts of AIM’s recent past.353  Although AIM proved to be a 
highly responsive regulator, it remains to be seen whether its particular 
system of self-regulation can take the strain of an increasing number of 
non-U.K. based companies.  Thus far the results appear to be mixed.  A 
survey conducted of AIM investors shows that the venue’s performance 
could have been negatively affected by the poorer quality of companies 
coming to the market during 2006.354  Analysts argue, however, that the 
2006 slowdown was due to market euphoria, which created unduly high 
expectations and gave way to an onslaught of new listings, some of 
which may have been mispriced.355  In any case, some preventive 
 349. See id. 
 350. See Smart Young Firms Find a Home on AIM, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, 
June 10, 2006, available at http://www.chi-med.com/eng/media/pdf/news060610.pdf.  
NASDAQ was considered too costly, Singapore’s exchange was deemed to be focused 
only on manufacturing companies, Hong Kong was excluded since investors apparently 
mostly deal in the securities of large companies, and local venues were considered to be 
overregulated. Id. 
 351. See Sundeep Tucker, Listing on London’s Aim Bears Fruit For Asian Citrus, 
FIN. TIMES, May 30, 2007, at 3, available at http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?queryText=as 
ian+citrus&y=0&aje=true&x=0&id=070530000424&ct=0.  Asian Citrus, for instance, 
raised nearly £12 million (about $20 million).  Its issuance has been proclaimed as a 
success for the company, whose CEO described AIM as well organized and teeming 
with sophisticated institutional investors. Id. 
 352. See James Moore, Brokers Sound Alarm over U.S. Threat to AIM, THE 
INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Nov. 14, 2006, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/ 
mi_qn4158/is_20061114/ai_n16845272.  Market players are particularly wary of 
newly-listed Russian and Chinese companies. See id. 
 353. See Business: AIM Changes, supra note 334, at 1.  At one point, AIM had to 
suspend trading of securities issued by a number of cash shells which had raised public 
equity and subsequently refrained from undergoing any business activities. See id. 
 354. See BAKER TILLY ET AL., supra note 254, at 7. 
 355. See id. 
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measures were taken in response, including the new Nomad rulebook, 
which elevated the hurdles for admittance to AIM.356
The aforementioned liquidity constraints also impede AIM’s 
ambitions.  Although liquidity ratios appear to exponentially increase on 
a yearly basis, AIM still lacks sufficient trading volume to fully support 
larger companies or a fully-fledged venture capital market.357  
Companies that reach the later stages of their growth cycles will surely 
require enhanced levels of trading liquidity if they are to remain listed 
with AIM.  For these firms, liquidity is vital in determining the price 
shock that can be absorbed by a particular security during trading.358  
Conversely, start-ups value liquidity, particularly at the IPO stage, as the 
venture capitalists that back them often wish to exit their investment 
positions, yet still wish to ensure sufficient liquidity to promote further 
growth.359  The European Venture Capital Association believes that 
venture-backed firms require a truly pan-European market.  LSE’s 
purported acquisition of the Borsa Italiana360 and the removal of barriers 
to cross-border capital flows in the European Union can be seen as 
initial steps towards AIM becoming such a trading platform. 
 
 356. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 357. See BAKER TILLY ET AL., supra note 254, at 3.  However, AIM is rapidly 
maturing beyond its initial status as “nursery” to the Main Market, such that some of 
AIM’s largest companies have not even considered listing in the U.K.’s Official List. 
Id. 
 358. See Fulfilling the Promise of Venture-backed High Potential Companies 
(European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association, Brussels, Belgium), Oct. 
2005, at 3.  This notion of price shock refers to the impact on share price of events that 
alter the demand or supply of a given stock, such as investors selling shares or the 
exercise of management options.  A highly liquid stock with a daily trading volume of 
$1 billion will be able to absorb a $100 million shock with “little or no market impact.” 
Id.  A company with less liquid stock can see its share price negatively affected by a 
comparatively lower market shock. See id. 
 359. See id.  Other reasons include “[generating] sufficient trading commissions to 
support high quality sellside research coverage, . . . the orderly sale of venture capital 
positions to efficiently replace them with capital from institutional and retail investors.” 
Id. 
 360. See LSE Borsa Deal ‘Will be Approved,’ BBC NEWS, June 25, 2007, available 
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6236284.stm.  Both exchanges have recently 
agreed to a $2 billion merger in which Borsa Italiana shareholders would receive LSE 
shares.  Although the transaction must still be approved by shareholders, the LSE’s 
directors are confident that it will be completed successfully. Id. 
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IV.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Concurring events after the turn of the twenty-first century have 
allowed AIM to sway in its favor the market for small high-growth 
firms.  Its unique model, based on customized compliance and self-
regulation, has made it possible for this segment of the London Stock 
Exchange to thrive where others have failed.  AIM’s timing was 
impeccable; when regulatory costs were being raised on both sides of 
the Atlantic after notorious corporate scandals and the bursting of the 
technology bubble, AIM stood by its low-cost, high-standards 
philosophy.  In so doing, it supplied cost-efficient access to large pools 
of liquidity in order to meet an increasing demand from companies 
which could no longer list in the booming small-cap markets of the 
1990s. 
AIM’s regulatory model balances investor protection and 
compliance costs.  Its companies benefit from comply-or-explain rules 
which set low hurdles for listing and few ongoing obligations, as 
compared to other stock exchanges.  AIM regulation can be fine-tuned 
to better fit a firm’s distinct traits.  On the flipside, listed companies are 
severely constrained from embracing poor standards of disclosure and 
corporate governance.  AIM’s investor base is largely composed of 
sophisticated institutional investors that maintain close ties with the 
companies in which they invest.  Correspondingly, they would be 
reticent to pour resources into an enterprise that failed to meet certain 
benchmarks. 
More importantly, the exchange has partially delegated its 
regulatory authority to the so-called Nominated Advisers; namely, 
private firms that supervise and provide counsel to AIM firms.  Not 
unlike thespians, Nomads play multiple roles as gatekeepers, advisers, 
and regulators of AIM.  Nomad performance is driven by a unique 
incentive structure in which their reputational capital is pledged as a 
proxy for a firm’s suitability to AIM, its accuracy of ongoing disclosure, 
and its quality of internal governance structures. 
Despite this trade-off between light regulation and investor 
protection, AIM’s model is not without flaws.  Some of its smaller 
companies fail to meet profit forecasts.  Cash shells under the guise of 
investment companies have abused the market.  Liquidity appears to be 
constrained.  A few public companies have been fined or censured for 
grave misconduct, while others have imploded under shady 
circumstances.  Nevertheless, AIM has shown to be a highly responsive 
328 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF Vol. XIII 
 CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
regulator.  It has addressed gatekeeper failure by issuing a new set of 
guidelines for Nomads, which enhance disclosure by requiring all listed 
firms to establish websites with relevant company information.  It has 
also barred valueless cash shells from the market.  Still, AIM needs to 
improve considerably in a number of areas.  If it intends to mature into a 
deeper market and appeal to larger, international firms, it must fix its 
liquidity problems.  As it attracts more retail investors and non-U.K. 
based firms, it will surely have to tighten its rules.  While AIM’s 
continued ability to adjust to the ever-changing financial environment 
remains to be seen, the balance appears to be favorable for the venue’s 
innovative model. 
 
